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THE "POOR MAN'S WILL" GAINS RESPECTABILITY:
USING THE MINNESOTA MULTI-PARTY ACCOUNTS ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
A joint tenancy bank account or a Totten trust is commonly called the
poor man's will, and consistent with the connotations of that sobriquet, has
long been accorded a second-class status in American law.' Though these and
other similar kinds of multi-party bank accounts are familiar will substitutes,
the survivor's ability to claim the proceeds of the account after the death of
the depositor has been grounded more in judicial grace than legal right. In
many jurisdictions, it has been impossible to predict with any degree of cer-
tainty whom the courts would consider the beneficial owner of funds on
deposit in the account, rendering its use as an instrument of financial
planning risky if not impossible.
2
Recently, informal means of transferring property at death have met with
less judicial disfavor than was formerly the case. While a will or formal
declaration of trust is the most certain means by which to direct the disposi-
tion of one's property after death, a multi-party bank account will usually
effectuate the decedent's intent more fully than intestacy. The courts and
legislatures have gradually recognized that formal estate planning devices are
not a viable option for a large portion of the population. Their estates are
simply too small to support the legal and financial management costs of
modern estate planning. Consequently, new techniques are being developed
to permit the poor and middle class to achieve through will substitutes a de-
gree of control over the post-mortem disposition of property which was pre-
viously attainable only by more traditional means.
Minnesota law has followed this developing pattern. Until the 1973
Legislature enacted the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act,' the rights of
owners of multi-party bank accounts were governed only by a bank protec-
tion statute 4 and a collection of case law that might be called anything but
1. See Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.L. REV. 214 (1963); Hines, Per-
sonal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law, Fact and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1970);
Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank Account Muddle, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 376 (1959);"
Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a Name, 41 CALIF. L.
REV. 596 (1953); Townsend, Creation of Joint Rights Between Husband and Wife in Personal
Property (pts. 1-2), 52 MICH. L. REV. 779, 957 (1954); Comment, Further Refinements in the
Law ofJoint Bank Accounts, 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 302 (1972).
2. See authorities collected in note I supra.
3. MINN. STAT. ch. 528 (Supp. 1973).
4. Id. §48.30 (1971).
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consistent.5 Although the bank protection statute had been adopted primarily
to protect financial institutions against liability for wrongfully paying out
funds to a named party to the account,6 the courts gleaned from it a presump-
tion of beneficial ownership among the parties.' The resultant case law was
frequently-changing and riddled with gaps.
Recognizing the need for a stable basis for personal financial planning, the
courts and the bar called for legislative reform.' In 1973, the Legislature
responded with the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act, an attempt at a
comprehensive system of regulating the use of multi-party accounts, whether
as will substitutes or for convenience. The Act defines various types of multi-
party accounts, establishes the rights of the parties during their lifetimes and
after death, and regulates the relationship between the parties and the
financial institution. In addition to changing some of the court-made rules,
the Act fills in many of the gaps in prior law.
This note will analyze the changes in Minnesota law effected by the Act,
compare it to its parent, the Uniform Probate Code, and evaluate both its
strengths and potential weaknesses. Breaking new ground as it does, the Act
will necessarily give rise to unanswered questions and present new legal
issues. Nevertheless, it is, on balance, a creditable attempt to provide cer-
tainty where confusion had previously reigned.
II. THE STATUS OF THE LAW PRIOR TO THE
ADOPTION OF THE MINNESOTA MULTI-PARTY ACCOUNTS ACT
A brief look at the common law history of the multi-party account in
Minnesota is necessary to an understanding of the statutory changes. Minne-
sota case law has dealt extensively with the ownership of joint accounts and
trust accounts after the death of a party or depositor, but has given little
consideration to the rights of the parties during their lives. Each of these
bodies of law will be separately examined. It should be noted that the pay-on-
death account, authorized by the new Act, had no precedent in Minnesota law.
A. The Joint Account
The joint account is distinguished by its alternative designation of two or
more named persons, e.g., "John Doe or Mary Doe." 9 The contract between
5. See L. JOHNSON & R. REISTER, MINNESOTA ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 24-32 (Supp. 1972).
6. Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 188, 130 N.W.2d 473,477 (1964) (dictum).
7. See notes 20 to 30 infra and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Erickson v. Kalmen, 291 Minn. 41, 48, 189 N.W.2d 381, 386 (1971) (dissenting
opinion); L. JOHNSON & R. REISTER, supra note 5, at 30.
9. Minnesota law has never required the use of this or any other precise phrase to create a
joint account. See Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 435, 229 N.W.
865, 867 (1930) (dictum). Prior to the adoption of the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act,
the statutes did not define the term "joint account." A statutory reference to "joint and several"
accounts, however, implied that such an account should be designated in the alternative rather
than in the conjunctive. There was apparently no requirement that rights of survivorship be men-
1974]
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the bank and the parties normally provides that the funds are payable to any
of the named parties and are to be owned by them jointly with rights of sur-
vivorship.10 Such terms, however, are not necessarily controlling. The juris-
dictions have applied no fewer than four different theories to resolve owner-
ship questions: (i) the contract theory, which considers the agreement be-
tween the bank and the depositor determinative of ownership and views the
donee as a third-party beneficiary who can enforce the contract against the
bank; (ii) the gift theory, which views the depositor as the owner of the funds
until he makes a completed inter vivos gift to the other party; (iii) the trust
theory, which views the depositor as a trustee for the other party; and (iv) the
joint-tenancy theory, which applies the law of real property to joint bank
accounts."
While it is generally accurate to say that Minnesota was a gift theory
jurisdiction, 2 the vagaries inherent in the application of that theory made the
label of limited value in predicting the outcome of actual cases. Indeed, it was
not even altogether certain that Minnesota followed the gift theory in de-
termining the ownership of the funds during the lives of all of the parties. The
case law on the issue is scant and conflicting. In the one reported Minnesota
decision arising out of an action between existing parties to a joint account,"
the court did not look to any applicable contract terms, but instead, relying
on case law governing ownership rights after the death of the depositor, stated
without extensive discussion that the appropriate test was whether the
depositor of the funds had made a completed inter vivos gift to the other
tioned. See MiNN. STAT. § 48.30 (1971). The new act does define "joint account" and requires
that the account be designated as "joint" or that it provide that the proceeds are payable to one
of the named parties and the survivor of them. See MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 5 (Supp. 1973).
10. Typical of the contract forms used in Minnesota are:
"If several owners are named herein, any one of them, or the survivor of them, is re-
ferred to by the use of the term 'owner' and may be treated by the Bank as though he or
she were the sole owner of this certificate for all purposes, including payment of interest
or principal, presentment, transfer and giving or receiving of notice." (form used in
Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 260, 179 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1970)).
'You are hereby authorized to recognize either signature below in the payment of funds or the
transaction of any other business for my account.' " (language used in Dyste v. Farmers &
Mechanics Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 432, 229 N.W. 865, 866 (1930));
"The amount listed on the reverse side hereof is a joint and several account. All funds
now or hereafter deposited in said account by either or any of the depositors shall be the
property of the depositors jointly with the right of survivorship. Each depositor shall
have complete and absolute authority over said account during the joint lives of the de-
positors and may withdraw all or any part of such funds on checks or other withdrawal
orders signed by either or any of the depositors and by the survivor or survivors in case
of death of any thereof." (signature card litigated in Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233
Minn. 467,468,47 N.W.2d 194, 195 (1951)).
II. For a detailed discussion of these theories see, Comment, Further Refinement in the Law
ofJoint Bank Accounts, supra note 1.
12. The gift theory was first adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in McLeod v. Henne-
pin County Say. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N.W. 987 (1920).
13. Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N.W.2d 542 (1949).
[Vol. I
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named party.14 The only other reported decisions 5 to consider the owner-
ship of an account during the lives of the parties arose out of an attempt by a
creditor of one of the parties to garnish 6 and levy 7 upon the entire corpus of
the account. Stating that the terms of the contract between the parties and the
financial institution were binding, the court held for the creditor on the theory
that the contract gave each party, and his subrogated creditors, a right to all
of the funds.' No simple reconciliation of the two cases suggests itself, and
although the Minnesota court later rejected the contract theory in a case
contesting the ownership of an account after the death of the depositor, 9 it
has never overruled its earlier decisions, nor again considered the ownership
rights in multi-party bank accounts during the lives of the parties.
The uncertainty of the law governing the parties' rights during their lives,
however, was of relatively little importance compared to the problem of de-
termining ownership after the death of the depositor, since most joint bank
account disputes arose when either the executor or administrator of a de-
ceased depositor's estate attempted to claim the proceeds of the account. The
first such case to reach it, the Minnesota court decided by application of the
gift theory alone.20 Later, however, it supplemented that theory with the pre-
sumption, drawn from the bank protection statute,2' that the depositor in-
14. The report of the case does not reveal whether there was a contract purporting to control
ownership rights. See id. at 394, 35 N.W.2d at 547. The unique factual context of Loth, one sus-
pects, may have had some effect upon the legal theory chosen by the court. After his wife had
been granted a divorce, Loth appealed, contending that the alimony awarded Mrs. Loth ex-
ceeded one-third of his total property, the maximum amount of alimony permitted by statute.
In order to achieve this mathematical result, Loth included in the valuation of his total prop-
erty sums which he had deposited in joint accounts and which his wife had withdrawn and used to
meet her personal expenses. Though one would hesitate to extend Loth beyond its facts, it
appears that several other jurisdictions apply the gift theory to determine ownership rights dur-
ing life. See Staton v. Vernon, 209 Iowa 1123, 229 N.W. 763 (1930); Bradford v. Eastman, 229
Mass. 499, 118 N.E. 879 (1918): Dempsey v. First Nat'l Bank, 359 Pa. 177, 58 A.2d 14 (1948);
Plainse v. Engle, 262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W.2d 89 (1952), modified, 262 Wis. 506, 57 N.W.2d 586
(1953).
15. See notes 16 & 17 infra. These two cases arose from the same fact situation but separate
appeals were taken. One appeal by defendant and intervenor was from the judgment against the
garnishee and one appeal from an order releasing one-half of the joint account from levy was
taken by all parties.
16. Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951).
17. Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 473,47 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
18. Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 472, 47 N.W.2d 194, 196 (1951); Park
Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 473, 475, 47 N.W.2d 197, 198 (1951).
19. Erickson v. Kalman, 291 Minn. 41,45, 189 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1971).
20. McLeod v. Hennepin County Sav. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 176 N.W. 987 (1920).
21. MINN. STAT. §48.30(1971):
When any deposit shall be made by or in the names of two or more persons upon joint
and several account, the same, or any part thereof, and the dividends or interest thereon,
may be paid to either of these persons or to a survivor of them, or to a personal repre-
sentative of the survivor.
The act has existed in slightly varying forms since 1879. More recently, similar statutes appli-
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tended to make a gift to the other party and to vest ownership of the account
in him.2 2 Previously, the Minnesota court had refused to decide whether the
statute affected the rights of the parties inter se or merely protected the bank
against liability after it had paid out funds to the named survivor.
23
This change in judicial attitude may have been prompted by the harshness
of the gift theory as originally adopted and applied.24 Judicial insistence upon
strict proof of the traditional elements of an inter vivos gift, donative intent
and completed delivery, 25 would have resulted in denying survivorship rights
in most cases. 26 Despite the fact that the courts deemed the surviving party's
right to make withdrawals a present beneficial interest, evidencing a com-
pleted delivery sufficient to support a gift, 27 his burden of proof remained
onerous.2" The court's use of the bank protection statute29 to find a presump-
tion of ownership in the surviving joint tenant, however, lent an aura of cer-
tainty to the law governing ownership rights in joint accounts.
Unfortunately, the sense of security engendered by this line of cases was to
prove false. The Minnesota court in a 1970 decision 3 though reaffirming the
viability of the gift theory3 2 significantly weakened the presumption of
donative intent.33 As originally formulated, the presumption was one which
"casts upon those who claim otherwise the burden of proving that such was
not the intention of the donor."34 As modified by the court, it was a "bursting
cable to savings and loan institutions and credit unions have been enacted. See MINN. STAT. §§
51A.23, 52.13 (1971). For the sake of simplicity, these statutes and all of their predecessors are
collectively referred to as "the bank protection act."
22. This presumption was first enunciated in Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 179
Minn. 430, 229 N.W. 865 (1930).
From the fact that the statute authorizes the payment of the residue to the survivor or to
the personal representative of such survivor, a presumption arises that such residue is
the absolute property of the survivor, and casts upon those who claim otherwise the
burden of proving that such was not the intention of the donor. Id. at 435, 229 N.W. at
867.
23. McLeod v. Hennepin County Say. Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 302, 176 N.W. 987, 988 (1920).
24. Kepner, supra note 1, at 598.
25. See Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 261, 179 N.W.2d 607, 610 (1970); Brennan v.
Carroll, 260 Minn. 521, 528, 111 N.W.2d 229, 234 (1961); McLeod v. Hennepin County Sav.
Bank, 145 Minn. 299, 301, 176 N.W. 987, 988 (1920). See generally J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 115 (1962).
26. See. e.g., Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 264, 179 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1970).
27. McLeod v. Hennepin County Sav. Bank, 145 Minn. 299,301, 176 N.W. 987, 988 (1920).
28. See Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 263, 179 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1970).
29. MINN. STAT.§48.30(1971).
30. The rule was cited with approval in several subsequent cases. Brennan v. Carroll, 260
Minn. 521, 1II N.W.2d 229 (1961); Zigan v. LeBlanc, 191 Minn. 538, 254 N.W. 810 (1934); Hall
v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 428, 229 N.W. 867 (1930).
31. Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N.W.2d 607 (1970).
32. Id. at 261, 179 N.W.2d at 610.
33. Id. at 263, 179 N.W.2d at 611-12.
34. Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 430,435, 229 N.W. 865,867 (1930).
See Brennan v. Carroll, 260 Minn. 521, 533 n.4, Ill N.W.2d 229, 237 n.4 (1961), wherein the
[Vol. I
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bubble" presumption, disappearing upon the introduction of any evidence
tending to negative the existence of a gift.
35
Diluting the effect of the presumption significantly reduced the likelihood
that the surviving party would prevail and emphasized the need for statutory
reform. Since the contracts used by banks to establish a joint account com-
monly provide that the proceeds are payable to the survivor, 36 it would
seem logical to assume that most depositors expect that result. Based on that
common sense rationale, the presumption had the effect of carrying out the
intent of the depositor in those cases where there would otherwise have been a
failure of proof; to that extent the 1970 decision was inconsistent with the gift
theory's avowed purpose of giving great weight to the depositor's intent.37
One year later, the Minnesota court again dealt a blow to a depositor's
intent."', Where the creator of a three-party joint account died, and one of the
surviving joint parties also died a short time later, the surviving donee and the
estate of the deceased donee were held to own the proceeds of the account as
tenants in common.3" The effect of the decision was to make the use of a joint
bank account as a will substitute impractical where more than one donee was
involved.
court corrected the trial court's quotation of 7 DUNNELL DIGEST § 3430 (3d. ed. 1952), stating,
"The exact language ... is . . . 'substantial proof to the contrary.' " (emphasis added).
35. Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 263, 179 N.W.2d 607,611 (1970).
36. See examples cited in note l0supra.
37. See Hines, supra note l, at 527. The author conducted an empirical study of the uses of the
joint and survivorship form in person property and found that 81 percent of those with savings
accounts and 89 percent of those with checking accounts used the survivorship form.
38. See Erickson v. Kalman, 291 Minn. 41, 189 N.W.2d 381 (1971). Hulda Dahlroos had
established joint accounts with her two daughters, Irma Kalman and Ruth Erickson. Id. at
42-43, 189 N.W.2d at 382-83. The account contract provided that the sums in the account would
be "payable to any of us or to the survivor of us or to the personal representative of such sur-
vivor." Id. at 42 n.1, 189 N.W.2d at 382 n.I. The evidence showed that Mrs. Dahlroos had in-
tended that the proceeds of the account pass to her daughters upon her death. Id. at 44, 189
N.W.2d at 384-85. Mrs. Dahlroos and her daughter Ruth died on the same day, the daughter a
few hours later than the mother. Id. at 43, 189 N.W.2d at 383. Though it was clearly contrary to
the intent of Mrs. Dahlroos, the court held that Ruth Erickson's husband was entitled to half of
the proceeds of the account. Id. at 49,189 N.W.2d at 386.
39. 291 Minn. at 49, 189 N.W.2d at 386. The result was based upon an interpretation of the
bank protection act, which stated that the financial institution would be protected if it paid the
proceeds to either A or B or the personal representative of the survivor. The court concluded that
the presumption of survivorship arose only at the death of the donor and would not continue be-
tween the survivors absent a showing that the original donor so intended. Id. at 47, 189 N.W.2d
at 385. The statutory language is ambiguous and is easily susceptible of a different construction.
See MINN. STAT. § 48.30 (1971). The court could have concluded that "[the] survivor" to whom
the proceeds may be paid referred to the last survivor of the donees rather than to a survivor of
the orginal depositor. The result of that construction, of course, would be to continue to apply
the presumption between surviving donees.
Erickson was a case of first impression for the Minnesota court, although a federal court,
applying Minnesota law, had predicted the result a number of years earlier. See Cashman v.
Mason, 166 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1948).
1974]
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B. Trust Accounts
Trust accounts are designated in the name of the depositor "in trust for" a
specified person, e.g., "John Doe in trust for Mary Doe."4 0 Since there is
generally no accompanying written declaration of trust,4 it is difficult, if not
impossible, to ascertain the depositor's intent.4"
Determining the ownership of funds in a trust account during the life of the
depositor was a simple matter in Minnesota prior to the enactment of the
Multi-Party Accounts Act. Minnesota followed the nearly universal rule" that
the deposit of funds in this form creates by itself neither a present trust nor a
completed gift, but merely a "tentative trust" which passes no interest to the
beneficiary during the life of the depositor." In other words, a trust account
was revocable at will.45 Disputes arose, however, after the death of the deposi-
tor when the executor or administrator of his estate attempted to claim the
proceeds of the account.
In establishing a set of rules for determining ownership after death, the
Minnesota court turned first to the case law of New York. 41 In a 1918 case47
40. Apparently, it has never been necessary that the account take precisely this form so long
as the intent to create a trust account could be ascertained. See MINN. STAT. § 48.30 (1971).
Cf R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 168 (2d ed. 1955). The new act, in defining trust accounts,
specifically provides that payment to the beneficiary need not be mentioned in the contract es-
tablishing the account. See note 69 infra.
41. The contract between the depositor and the financial institution, even though it may pro-
vide that the bank will pay over the funds to the named beneficiary upon the depositor's death,
is usually inadequate to serve as a declaration of trust since there has been no formal conveyance
of the funds. See 2 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 142(e), (f) (2d ed.
1965).
42. The depositor may, for example, have desired merely to establish an account with Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation protection. This technique has been used by persons who
wish to establish bank accounts in the names of others while still retaining control over the
accounts, thus evading the maximum dollar limitation upon FDIC protection of the funds of any
one depositor. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 331 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 (1959).
44. Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 188, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1964) (dictum);
Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 581, 2 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1942); Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn.
455, 457, 168 N.W. 353, 354 (1918) (dictum). See Branch v. Dawson, 36 Minn. 193, 30 N.W.
545 (1886).
45. Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 581, 2 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1942); In re Totten, 179 N.Y.
112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
46. The classic case of In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), first gave legal effect
to the type of bank account now commonly called a Totten Trust, concluding that an account by
A in trust for B was a tentative, revocable trust, the proceeds of which would be presumed to be-
come the property of the beneficiary at the death of the depositor. In the actual language of the
opinion:
It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the
gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the pass-
book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary with-
out revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption
arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor. Id. at 126, 71 N.E. at 752.
47. Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 N.W. 353 (1918).
[Vol. I
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the Minnesota court held that a bank account established by decedent, A, in
trust for B, was to pass to B if A had intended that it do so, 4" and then adopted
the New York presumption that he had in fact so intended.49 The presump-
tion that the proceeds of the account were to become the property of the bene-
ficiary upon the death of the depositor was bolstered when the court further
found that the presumption, much like the presumption governing the owner-
ship ofjoint accounts, was grounded in the bank protection statute.50
Despite some early criticism that the judicial recognition of Totten trusts
would subvert the Statute of Wills, 5s the rule was nevertheless applied in a
number of subsequent cases .5 However, since the trust account can have no
purpose other than to serve as a will substitute, it appeared inequitable to
permit the depositor to use it to disinherit his spouse when he could not
achieve the same result by means of a will.53 The Minnesota court first con-
fronted the problem in 1964.54 Though it held that the use of the trust account
to transfer assets which would otherwise be includable in the probate estate
did not constitute a fraud upon marital rights under existing Minnesota law,55
48. Id. at 461, 168 N.W. at 355.
49. Id. at 460, 461, 168 N.W. at 354, 355. The court, after stating the rule of Totten, went on
to conclude that the presumption had not been overcome, since there was no evidence of a con-
trary intent on the part of the depositor. Of some significance to the court was the fact that the
depositor had retained possession of the passbook and had withdrawn small sums from the
account during his lifetime.
50. Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 187, 130 N.W.2d 473, 476 (1964) (semble);
Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937) (semble);
Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 431, 229 N.W. 865, 866 (1930)
(semble).
With respect to trust accounts that statute provides:
When any deposit shall be made by any person in trust for another, and no other written
notice of the existence and terms of any legal and valid trust shall have been given to the
bank, in case of the death of the trustee, the same, or any part thereof, and the dividends
or interest theron, may be paid to the person for whom the deposit was made. MINN.
STAT. §48.30 (1971).
As in the case of the joint account, the language of the statute could easily be construed to govern
only the bank's potential liability to third parties for wrongfully paying over the proceeds of the
account and not to affect the rights of the depositor and beneficiary. But see Estate of Jeruzal v.
Jeruzal, supra at 187, 130 N.W.2d at 477.
51. See 14 MINN. L. REV. 701, 703 (1930): "The result [in Totten] is perhaps desirable, but it
is questionable whether establishing such a rule is not a matter more properly for the legislature
than for the courts."
52. E.g., Coughlin v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937);
Dyste v. Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank, 179 Minn. 430, 229 N.W. 865 (1930); Walso v.
Latterner, 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711 (1919).
53. MINN. STAT. § 525.16 (1971) allows a spouse to elect against the will of a deceased spouse
and thereby be entitled to a share of the estate even though the decedent may have specifically
intended that the surviving spouse receive nothing.
54. Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
55. Id. at 194, 130 N.W.2d at 481. Under the case law at that time, an inter vivos transfer
would not be held a fraud upon marital rights merely because of the existence of an intent to de-
1974]
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the court called for legislative reform 5 and announced that in the absence of
legislative action it would feel free to redress the inequity by applying the
Restatement rule in future cases.5 7 That rule would permit satisfaction of the
spouse's forced share from the trust account, but only after the general assets
of the estate were exhausted."' In a subsequent case,59 however, the court
appeared to adopt a slightly different rule, affirming a lower court order that
the proceeds of certain accounts, which were in essence trust accounts,60 be
fully included in the probate estate. The court apparently employed the
theory that the accounts were totally invalid attempts to transfer assets.".
The confusion was increased by enactment of a statute permitting the sur-
viving spouse to treat any conveyance as a testamentary disposition, to the
extent of marital rights, if the decedent retained a power of appointment,
revocation, or consumption, even though the estate was not insolvent. 2
The rapid change in the applicable law not only rendered trust accounts un-
reliable estate planning tools, but the new statute was itself less than fully
effective.6 3 It became obvious that legislative attention to the entire subject of
trust accounts would be necessary if the policy issues lurking behind the legal
issues were ever to be fully resolved.64
Ill. THE MINNESOTA MULTI-PARTY ACCOUNTS ACT-
ANALYSIS OF A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act65 attempts to create a compre-
hensive system of regulating the rights of the parties to multi-party accounts.
Although most of its sections are borrowed from the Uniform Probate
prive one's spouse of the statutory inheritance. The only test was whether the transfer was gen-
uine. Balafas v. Balafas, 263 Minn. 267, 117 N.W.2d 20 (1962); Van Devere v. Moore, 243
Minn. 346, 67 N.W.2d 664 (1954). See Nash v. Kirschoff, 157 Minn. 418, 196 N.W. 488 (1923);
Smith v. Wold, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N.W. 1067 (1914).
56. Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 195, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481 (1964).
57. Id. at 195, 130 N.W.2d at 481,482.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment e at 157-58 (1959).
59. Kempf v. Kempf, 288 Minn. 244, 179 N.W.2d 715 (1970).
60. Though the accounts were joint accounts in form, the evidence established that decedent
intended to retain exclusive power of enjoyment over the funds until his death at which point he
intended the proceeds to pass to the other named parties. Id. at 247, 179 N.W.2d at 717.
61. Id. at 248, 179 N.W.2d at 717-18. It appears from the facts of the case that the donees of
the accounts were not the sole residuary legatees under decedent's will. Id. Thus, the result would
be quite different than if the Restatement rule were applied.
62. Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 1003, § I (codified at MINN. STAT. § 525.213 (1971)).
63. Minnesota Legal Developments- 7he Minnesota Legislature, 1969 Session -Spouse's
Rights in Non-Probate Assets Expanded, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1029 (1970). The work concludes
that the statute does not fully succeed in preventing a testator from disinheriting his spouse and
argues that a better solution may be to recognize the conveyances for all purposes as specific be-
quests and treat them in that manner.
64. See Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 195, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481-82 (1964); L.
JOHNSON & R. REISTER,supra note 5, at 30.
65. MINN. STAT. ch. 528 (Supp. 1973).
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Code, 6 it contains some unique provisions.6 7 Not only does it provide rules
for determining the ownership of the proceeds of the two types of multi-party
accounts previously recognized in Minnesota, the joint account68 and the trust
account, 69 but it also authorizes a third type, the pay-on-death account. 0 In
addition to providing statutory authority for all three types of accounts," the
Act governs the ownership of sums on deposit in the account during the lives
of the parties,7" provides for the disposition of the funds after the death of one
or more of the parties,73 and establishes a set of rules for determining the
rights and liabilities of the financial institutions.7"
The Act attempts to strike a balance between two diverse and often com-
peting public policy goals-providing certainty as to the ownership of funds
in joint accounts and allowing sufficient flexibility so that the intentions of
the users of multi-party accounts can be effectuated." The former system, as
previously discussed, achieved neither result.76 The new Act employs two
basic statutory techniques in its attempt to reconcile these goals. First, it
separates the relationship between the financial institution and depositor
from that between the parties to the account.77 Second, it rejects gift, trust,
and joint tenancy theories of ownership as used at common law, and adopts
66. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 6-101 to -113 (1974 official text) [hereinafter cited as UPC].
See generally ASSOCIATION OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATORS, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL (1972) [hereinafter cited as PRACTICE MANUAL]; Johnson,
Multiple Party Bank Accounts Under the Uniform Probate Code, 90 BANK. L.J. 497 (1973).
67. Throughout the following discussion of the Act, parallel citations to the UPC will be
given where the provisions in the two acts are identical.
68. The Act defines a joint account as any account so designated or any account payable on
request "to one or more of two or more parties and to the survivor of them." MINN. STAT.
§ 528.02, subd. 5 (Supp. 1973).
69. A trust account is defined as an account in the name of one or more parties as trustee for
one or more beneficiaries. The account must be the sole subject of the trust and the trust rela-
tionship must be established solely by the form of the account and the deposit agreement, though
that agreement need not "mention" payment to the beneficiary. Id. § 528.02, subd. 15.
70. A P.O.D. account is defined as any account payable on request to one or more designated
persons during their lifetimes, and payable after their deaths upon the request of one or more
designated persons. Id. § 528.02, subd. I1; UPC § 6-101(10). As a practical matter, there is little
difference between a trust account and a P.O.D. account except that the trust account may be
irrevocable either by its terms or upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that an irrevocable
trust was intended, while a P.O.D. account is never irrevocable. Compare MINN. STAT.
§ 528.04(b) with .04(c). See notes 126 to 139 infra and accompanying text.
71. The general scope and organization of the Minnesota Act are the same as those of the
Uniform Probate Code. For a discussion of the organization, see PRACTICE MANUAL § 15.1.
72. MINN. STAT. § 528.04 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103.
73. MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973). The corresponding provision of the UPC, § 6-104,
does not provide for a change of the disposition of the account by will.
74. MINN. STAT. §§ 528.09-.14 (Supp. 1973). These sections regarding the protection of
financial institutions, are beyond the scope of this note, except insofar as they may relate to or
affect the rights of the parties inter se.
75. See MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973); UPC §§ 6-103, Comment, -104, Comment.
76. See notes 9 to 64 supra and accompanying text.
77. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.03, .13 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-102, Comment.
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the contract theory within the limitations imposed by the specific statutory
provisions. 8 This section will analyze the relative efficacy of these techniques
in achieving the goals of the Act and will compare the results reached under
the Act with those which would have obtained under the prior law. Further, it
will analyze the significant differences between the Minnesota Act and the
UPC in light of those goals.
A. Ownership and Survivorship- The Basic Provisions
Governing Rights to Sums on Deposit in a Multi-Party Account
It should be noted at the outset that the very enactment of the Multi-Party
Accounts Act was to some extent inconsistent with the goal of carrying out the
intentions of the users of those accounts in that it again changed the applic-
able rules. Whatever long-term improvements were intended, the change
necessarily produced some short-term disruption. The Act took effect on
August 1, 1973, 71 2 months after its enactment, 0 and clearly applies to
pre-existing accounts. 8 The delay between the date of enactment and the
effective date permitted the parties to alter existing accounts to avoid un-
intended results and subsequent allegations that the Act impermissibly
impaired vested rights," but its application to pre-existing accounts still re-
mains troublesome.
The drafters of the UPC defend its similar treatment of existing accounts83
upon policy grounds which may also apply to the Minnesota Act. First, the
Act will establish a presumption of survivorship, and most persons using
multi-party accounts desire survivorship rights to attach.84 Second, were the
Act to result in survivorship where it was not in fact intended, an escape
78. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.06, .07 (Supp. 1973); UPC §§ 6-105, -106. This rejection is ex-
plicitly applicable only to survivorship rights.
79. Since the Act contained no specific effective date it was governed by MINN. STAT. § 645.02
(1971), which provides: "Each act, except one making appropriations, enacted finally at any
session of the legislature takes effect on August 1 next following its final enactment, unless a
different date is specified in the act."
80. The act was signed into law May 23, 1973.
81. The Act contains no grandfather clause exempting those accounts from its purview. See
MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 2 (Supp. 1973) (definition of "account"); UPC § 6-101(1). Despite
the fact that the Minnesota Legislature did not adopt UPC § 8-101(b)(5), which expressly pro-
vides that the multi-party accounts provisions apply to accounts opened prior to the effective
date of the act, the broad definition of "account" incorporated into the Minnesota Act should
produce the same result.
82. See Builders Ltd. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Compensation Ins. Bd., 151 Minn. 427, 431, 186
N.W. 860, 861 (1922). Quaere, however, whether the Act can be applied to survivorship rights
in a pre-existing account where the depositor's death occurred prior to the enactment of the
statute, allowing him no opportunity to alter the account to conform with the provisions of
the new Act. Cf Minnesota Legal Developments- The Minnesota Legislature. 1969 Session-
Spouse's Rights in Non-Probate Assets Expanded, supra note 63, at 1049-50.
83. UPC § 6-104, Comment.
84. UPC § 6-104, Comment. See generally Hines, supra note I.
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clause is available so that the depositor's intent may be carried out.85 Third,
the delayed effective date permits financial institutions to notify their cus-
tomers of the changes."6 In short, both the UPC and the Minnesota Act
appear to adopt the policy that it is desirable to have all multi-party accounts
governed by the same rules even though that may mean in some instances
that the intent of the parties will be momentarily frustrated. In order to
determine whether this admittedly transitory problem is indeed outweighed
by the long-term advantages of the Act, it is necessary to analyze each of the
major provisions of the Act in light of the legislative purpose and with
reference to the prior law.
1. Ownership of Sums on Deposit During the Life of the Depositor
a. Joint Accounts
The section"7 of the Act governing ownership of the three types of accounts
during the lives of the parties88 provides that the sums on deposit 8 in a
joint account are owned by the parties to the account in proportion to the net
contributions 0 of each of them, unless there is clear and convincing evidence
of a contrary intent. 91 Thus, the Act presumes that a depositor does not in-
tend to make an irrevocable gift of the funds to other named parties, although
extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a completed gift was made.92
The Act is silent as to ownership in the event of a failure of proof on the
issue of the contributions of the parties. Two alternatives appear possible.
First, the court could divide the sums on deposit equally between the parties,
as suggested by the drafters of the UPC, 3 or second, the court could follow
85. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-104. Although this remedy is theoret-
ically available, it should be reiterated that clear and convincing evidence of the depositor's
intent is needed to rebut the presumption created by the statute and that this is a difficult standard
of proof to meet.
86. UPC§6-104, Comment.
87. MINN. STAT. § 528.04 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103.
88. "Party" is a defined term, meaning simply a person with a present right to payment
from the account upon his request. MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 8 (Supp. 1973): UPC § 6-101(7).
Thus, the payee of a P.O.D. account and the beneficiary of a revocable trust account are not
parties until the death of the depositor. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103.
89. The term is defined to mean the total balance payable on the account at the time in ques-
tion. MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 14 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-101(13).
90. A party's "net contribution" equals the sum of all deposits made by or for him, less all
withdrawals made by or for him unless the funds withdrawn are used by another party to the
account, plus a pro rata share of any interest or dividends. MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 7 (Supp.
1973); UPC § 6-101(6).
91. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(a) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(a).
92. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04(a) (Supp. 1973): UPC § 6-103(a); PRACTICE MANUAL § 15.5
93. UPC § 6-103, Comment. Although Minnesota did not specifically adopt the comments to
the UPC, the courts will probably give them great weight in interpreting the Act. MINN. STAT.
§ 645.22 (1971) provides, "Laws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and con-
strued to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact
them." The Minnesota court has interpreted this statute to mean that the intent of the National
19741
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the contract theory of analysis, which the Act adopts for survivorship pur-
poses,94 and allow the terms of the agreement with the bank to control. The
latter approach would generally give each party a beneficial interest in all
sums on deposit since the typical contract for a joint account gives each
named party the power to withdraw all of the funds. 5 The former approach,
however, appears more consistent with the Act's theory that the account is in
its essence a will substitute rather than a present joint tenancy."
The new statutory provisions offer a certainty absent from previous Minne-
sota law.97 The net contribution rule permits precise determinations in cases
where tracing is possible. Ownership may still be in doubt where proof of
deposits and withdrawals is lacking, though certainly no more so than under
prior Minnesota law. 9 In the event that the net contribution rule would be
harsh or inequitable in a particular case, clear and convincing evidence can be
introduced to show that the depositor intended to make a gift, or to discharge
a duty of support owed the other joint party.99 Thus, though the provision
offers a certainty not available under prior law, it remains sufficiently flex-
ible to avoid unintended consequences.
b. Trust and P.O.D. Accounts
The rules governing ownership of trust and P.O.D. accounts differ from
those governing the ownership of joint accounts. Sums on deposit in a P.O.D.
account belong to the original depositor during his lifetime, and the payees"' °
have no rights to them until his death.' If there are two or more orig-
inal depositors, the account is treated as a joint account as to them." 2 Simi-
larly, a trust account belongs to the depositor during his lifetime and the bene-
ficiary has no interest in it unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws becomes the intent of the Minnesota
Legislature upon its enactment of a uniform act. Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 290 & n. 13, 123 N.W.2d 371, 376 & n. 13 (1963)(dictum).
94. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.06-.07 (Supp. 1973); UPC §§ 6-105 to -106.
95. See examples quoted in note 10 supra.
96. UPC § 6-104, Comment.
97. See notes 12 to 19 supra and accompanying text. The relationship between ownership of
sums on deposit during the parties' lives and creditors' rights is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 140 to 147 infra.
98. See Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951).
99. See, e.g., Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 35 N.W.2d 542 (1949). The evidence showed that
the depositor had told his wife regarding sums placed in their joint account: "Well, now, take care
of all the household expenditures .. .or any of the expenditures, and whatever is left over, you
do with it as you please .... It is yours.'" Id. at 394, 35 N.W.2d at 547 (emphasis in original). It
would appear that such evidence would constitute clear and convincing evidence of an intent to
make a gift as required by the Act.
100. The term "payee" refers to any person designated as a person to whom the account is to
be paid upon his request after the death of all persons entitled to payment on request from the
account during their lifetimes. MINN. STAf. § 528.02, subd. 12 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-101(11).
101. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(b) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(b).
102. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(b) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(b).
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an irrevocable trust was intended. 10 3 In that event, the beneficiary has an
interest in the account though the depositor is still living. 04 If there are two
or more trustees, their ownership rights are determined as if the account were
ajoint account. 1"5
The Act also alters the rules governing ownership of trust accounts during
the life of the depositor. The new P.O.D. account is more analagous to
the Totten trust as it previously existed in Minnesota than is a trust account
created pursuant to the new Act. 06 The major change is the Act's approval of
the irrevocable trust account, previously unrecognized in Minnesota. 07
Though lack of familiarity with this new option may give rise to certain legal
and practical problems,' it does increase the flexibility of multi-party ac-
counts. By using the irrevocable trust account, the depositor may make a
completed inter vivos gift while at the same time postponing the donee's
possession and enjoyment until after the depositor's death, a result unob-
tainable under prior law. Since a completed inter vivos gift may never be
made by means of a P.O.D. account, it may be preferred where the depositor
desires to avoid ownership disputes during the lives of the parties. On the
other hand, the P.O.D. account cannot protect the funds against the claims of
the donor's creditors as effectively as an inter vivos gift made by means of a
joint or trust account. 9
2. Ownership After Death of a Party or Depositor
After the death of the depositor, the Multi-Party Accounts Act adopts the
broad rule that the surviving party, beneficiary, or payee owns the account
without regard to whether he had a beneficial interest in the funds during the
deceased party's lifetime."0 This is a major change from prior Minnesota law,
abolishing, as it does, the gift theory and the attendant burden of proving the
depositor's donative intent and delivery. It also appears to reject the trust
theory even with respect to trust and P.O.D. accounts. Instead, the applica-
tion of the various survivorship rules provided in the Act is determined by the
form of the account upon the date of the decedent's death." Consequently, a
party may alter survivorship rights by a written order to the financial insti-
103. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(c).
104. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(c).
105. MINN. STAT. § 528.04(c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(c).
106. See notes 40 to 64 supra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 43 to 45 supra and accompanying text.
108. Though a full discussion is beyond the scope of this note, it should be pointed out that
the creation of an irrevocable trust account may well have gift tax consequences. See note 236
infra.
109. For a discussion of the rights of creditors of the parties, see notes 140 to 179 infra and
accompanying text.
110. Wellman, Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Probate Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L.
REv. 453,484 (1970).
111. MINN. STAT. § 528.06 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-105.
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tution to change the form of the account, to stop payment, or vary the pay-
ment terms."2
Thus, the Act impliedly adopts the contract theory of analysis, and it would
seem that in light of the legislative decision that the form of the account is to
control, the courts cannot ignore the contract terms as they have felt free to
do in the past."3 This approach is more likely to carry out the depositor's
intent than is the gift theory previously applied by the Minnesota court, since
it seems relatively safe to assume that the parties intend the consequences to
which they agree in writing. These broad survivorship principles are imple-
mented by specific, slightly differing rules for each of the three types of
accounts.
a. Joint Accounts
Sums on deposit in a joint account at the time of the death of a party pass
to the surviving party or parties,"' unless a different intention is shown by
clear and convincing evidence," ' or unless a party provides by "valid will" for
a different disposition of funds deposited by him."' Where it is established
that no right of survivorship was intended, the decedent's interest in the
account becomes part of his probate estate."7
The presumption of survivorship established by the Act is much stronger
than that which previously existed in Minnesota. At various times the latter
could be rebutted by "substantial""' 8 or "any""' 9 evidence, while the clear and
convincing evidence now required is a far higher standard of proof.20 Since
most users of joint accounts probably desire survivorship, the new rule repre-
sents an improvement over prior law.' 2' On the other hand, the strengthened
presumption could be troublesome for those who do not wish survivorship
rights to attach. The Minnesota Legislature anticipated this difficulty and
112. MINN. STAT. § 528.06 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-105.
113. See, e.g., Erickson v. Kalman, 291 Minn. 41, 189 N.W.2d 381 (1971); Rutchick v.
Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N.W.2d 607 (1970), where donative intent, rather than the content of
the contract, was the determinative factor.
114. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(a) (Supp. 1973).
115. Id. The Minnesota Legislature slightly altered the equivalent UPC section which pro-
vides for survivorship unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intent "at the
time the account is created." The quoted language does not appear in the Minnesota Act, and
thus, arguably, proof could be submitted that the depositor changed his intent at some time after
the creation of the account. Compare id. with UPC § 6-104(a).
116. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(a), (c) (Supp. 1973). This, too, is a departure from the UPC which
provides that survivorship may not be disclaimed by will. UPC § 6-104(e). For a discussion of
the implications of this change see notes 218 to 288 infra and accompanying text.
117. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(d) (Supp. 1973); UPC 6-104(d).
118. See, e.g., Brennan v. Carroll, 260 Minn. 521, 533, 111 N.W.2d 229, 237 (1961).
119. See, e.g., Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 263, 179 N.W.2d 607, 611 (1970).
120. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 340 at 796-98 (2d ed. 1972); 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
121. For an empirical study of the widespread use of the joint account, see Hines, supra note I.
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attempted to accommodate those who wish to create "convenience" accounts
by providing model forms to be used to establish that intent. 2
Where there are two or more surviving parties to a joint account, the Act
changes prior Minnesota law and provides that the right of survivorship shall
continue between the survivors."' By this change, the Act once again renders
the joint account a useful estate planning tool in cases where a depositor
wishes to pass assets to more than one other person. In the somewhat unlikely
event that the parties do not desire survivorship to continue after the death of
one of the parties, a problem may arise, for the Act appears to make no ex-
ception to this rule even though a different intent can be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. 124 Thus, when the parties wish survivorship rights to
terminate after the first death of a party, the trust or P.O.D. account should
be used.1
2 5
b. Trust and P.O.D. Accounts
The trust account belongs to the named beneficiaries after the death of
the named trustee, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary
intent 2 1 or the trustee has made a different disposition by will. 127 Similarly,
sums on deposit in a P.O.D. account at the death of the depositor pass to the
named payee 28 in the absence of a change by will.2 9 Apparently, clear and
convincing evidence of a different intention on the part of the P.O.D. deposi-
tor will not prevent the payee from taking the proceeds of the account. 10
If the beneficiary or payee dies before the original depositor, the trust or
P.O.D. account becomes part of the depositor's estate.
13
1
The new rule governing survivorship rights in trust accounts is similar to
prior Minnesota law. Both create a strong presumption that the depositor
intended the proceeds to pass to the beneficiary at the depositor's death.1
2
Whether the clear and convincing evidence required to rebut that presump-
tion is a higher degree of proof than that required to rebut the common law
presumption is questionable as there is some indication that the latter pre-
sumption could be overcome only by proof of an attempt to revoke.
33
122. MINN. STAT. §§ 528.15-16 (Supp. 1973). For a discussion of the efficacy of this tech-
nique, see text accompanying notes 183 to 217 infra.
123. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(a) (Supp. 1973).
124. Id. Compare "sums remaining on deposit ... belong to the surviving party or parties...
unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention . with "the right of
survivorship continues between the surviving parties."
125. For a discussion of the presumption of survivorship between surviving parties and the
trust or P.O.D. account see text accompanying notes 134 to 139 infra.
126. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-104(c).
127. MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973).
128. Id. § 528.05(b); UPC § 6-104(b).
129. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973).
130. Compare id. §§ 528.05(a)and(c) with .05(b). SeePRACTICE MANUAL § 15.4.
131. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05(d) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-104(d); PRACTICE MANUAL § 15.4.
132. See notes 46 to 50 supra and accompanying text.
133. See In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112,126, 71 N.E. 748,752 (1904).
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The rule that survivorship rights attach to a P.O.D. account regardless of
any evidence of a contrary intent had no counterpart in prior Minnesota
law. 34 Its inclusion offers a certainty heretofore achievable only through the
use of a formal trust instrument.
135
Surviving multiple payees or beneficiaries do not take the account jointly
with right of survivorship unless the terms of the account or deposit agree-
ment expressly so provide. 1 6 At first there appears to be no logical reason for
treating these accounts differently from the joint account,'37 but, on closer
analysis, the distinction may be seen to flow from the contract theory adopted
by the Act. In the case of the joint account, all of the named parties are in
privity with each other as well as with the financial institution and thus can
be presumed to have intended survivorship rights to attach to their deposits. 3 s
Had they not wished the result prescribed by the statute, they need not have
become parties to the account. Beneficiaries of a trust account and of a
P.O.D. account, on the other hand, are not parties and are not in privity with
the financial institution, depositor, or other beneficiaries or payees. Not only
do they lack control over the terms of the account, but also, there is no evi-
dence on which to base a presumption that they would have intended any
particular legal relationship to arise as to each other. 3 9 Close attention to the
form of the contract establishing the account can assure that survivorship
between beneficiaries and payees can be provided where it is actually intended.
3. Rights of Creditors and Rights of Persons Entitled To Support
From a Party to the Account
a. Claims Arising During the Depositor's Lifetime
Inextricably entwined with the ownership of a multi-party account is the
134. This is not true merely because the P.O.D. account was not recognized by prior Minne-
sota law. No multi-party account, regardless of its specific form or label, had such characteristics
prior to the enactment of the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act. Sufficient evidence of a con-
trary intent could always overcome the presumption of survivorship. See notes 31 to 39 supra and
accompanying text.
135. See 6 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 41, at § 561.
136. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(b), (c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-104 (b), (c).
137. The comment to UPC § 6-104, acknowledges but does not explain the differing treatment.
138. As a practical matter, however, only the depositor determines the form of the account,
so that this special relationship among the parties to a joint account may in reality exist only
where all of the parties are also depositors. Allowing surviving joint parties to have the survivor-
ship right continue between them, while not permitting such a result in the case of a trust or
P.O.D. account, may simply be designed to allow the depositor to elect among the differing
results engendered by the different types of accounts.
139. The comments to earlier drafts of the UPC indicate that the drafting committee had in
mind such a distinction between joint parties and beneficiaries on the one hand and P.O.D.
payees on the other. See UPC § 6-106, Comment (Working Draft No. 5 1969):
No further survivorship between surviving beneficiaries of a trust account is presumed
because these persons probably have had no control over the form of the account prior
to the death of the trustee .... The situation concerning further survivorship between
two or more surviving parties to a nontrust, multiple-party account is different. Id.
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right of a creditor to reach funds in the account for the satisfaction of a debt.
Generally, a creditor is only allowed to invade the account to the extent of his
debtor's beneficial ownership of the funds in question.' The terms of the
new Act limit such beneficial ownership in a joint account to the net contri-
butions of the debtor.' 41 Whether or not this represents a departure from prior
Minnesota law is unclear. 4 2 While the new Act does fail to specify the rights
of the creditor should the debtor's contribution be unproven, 4 3 the general
application of the rule, nevertheless, should preclude the use of joint accounts
for the evasion of the claims of creditors." 4
The claims of a creditor to sums on deposit in a P.O.D. or trust account
should be simpler yet to resolve. Since the ownership of the account remains
with the depositor until his death,"45 there should be no question that his
creditors may reach all the funds and that creditors of the beneficiary or
payee can reach none. Where an irrevocable trust account is involved, on the
other hand, the creditors of the beneficiary, but not those of the depositor,
should be entitled to reach the funds."' Such considerations may effect the
decision to choose one form of multi-party account over another. Since it
affords almost complete protection against the claims of the trustee's credi-
tors," 7 the irrevocable trust account, even without regard to its other inci-
dents, may be the form of choice.
140. See Midland Loan Fin. Co. v. Kisar, 206 Minn. 134, 287 N.W. 869 (1939).
141. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.03, .04 (Supp. 1973). Technically, a party's beneficial interest
during his life is equal to the proportion his net contributions bear to sums on deposit. Id. Thus,
though he may be entitled to less, a party's beneficial interest should never exceed his net con-
tributions.
142. In the only reported case to consider such a problem, the court permitted the creditor of
one party to reach all of the funds in the account, but the result appears to be at least partially
attributable to the fact that tracing was impossible and the net deposits of each party could not
be determined. See Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 468-69, 471,47 N.W.2d 194,
195, 197 (1951).
143. Beneficial ownership of sums on deposit where there is a failure of proof as to net con-
tributions is uncertain, as the statute is silent on the subject. See notes 93 to 96 supra and accom-
panying text.
144. In the absence of proof of contributions, the Minnesota court in Park Enterprises, Inc.
v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 471, 47 N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (1951), relied upon general equitable
principles to prevent a fraud upon creditors. Utilizing an estoppel theory to permit the creditor to
reach all of the funds in the account, the court stated, "We shall not assume that intervener [sic]
took the risk that her husband would honor his debts out of this account merely because she
thought he could not be compelled to do so." Id. at 471, 47 N.W.2d at 197. It is logical to assume
that similar considerations might affect the court's decisions under the new Act in a case involv-
ing such a failure of proof, for the policy of preventing fraud upon creditors remains strong.
145. MINN. STAT. § 528.04 (b), (c) (Supp. 1973).
146. An irrevocable trust transfers beneficial ownership of the proceeds. Thus, the donor's
creditors should not be entitled to reach the contents of the account in tohe absence of fraud. See
generally Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296 (1890); I A G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 42,
at,§ 193, 211-30.
147. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.04(c), .08 (Supp. 1973). This account will insulate the funds from
creditors' claims even after the depositor's death. If the depositor is insolvent at the time of the
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b. Claims Arising After the Death of One of the Parties
If his rights were dependent on beneficial ownership alone, the creditor of
a deceased party would be denied access to the funds in a multi-party account
because of the strong presumption of ownership in favor of the survivor.4 8
However, public policy considerations may dictate that the creditors be
granted additional rights. After the death of a party, the state concerns itself
with the protection of his spouse or minor children. Not only are they entitled
to support from his property, 49 but his spouse may also inherit a forced share
of his estate.'50 Since taxpayers may be required to support his family if he is
allowed to disinherit them, the public policy considerations here are strong.
To protect these taxpayers, as well as creditors and dependents of the
decedent, statutes commonly provide for the invalidation of certain non-
testamentary transfers of a decedent by his estate.' 51 The Minnesota Multi-
Party Accounts Act adheres to this pattern and invalidates, in favor of the
depositor's insolvent estate, transfers to surviving parties to the extent
necessary to fund the payment of debts, taxes, expenses of administration,
and statutory allowances to the decedent's spouse and minor children.1
52
The language of the Minnesota Act differs in one significant respect,
however, from the language of its comparable UPC section. 3 While the
UPC seems to permit access to the entire account by an insolvent estate,
5 4
the Minnesota Act only allows invasion "to the extent the deceased party is
the source of the funds or beneficial owner."'' 55 The language added by the
Minnesota version of the Act is apparently intended for the protection of sur-
viving parties who had contributed funds to a joint account. Assume that joint
owners of a checking account, A and B, both contribute funds to the account.
If A dies, the presumption of survivorship would operate to pass the remain-
der of the account to B,15 6 Both the Minnesota and UPC versions would
clearly permit the estate of A to invade the account to the extent of A's net
contribution.'5 7 The phrase added by the Minnesota version of the Act,
however, would assure B that his funds would not be similarly invaded.
Though the Act is silent as to the party that must bear the burden of proof in
transfer, however, the transfer will almost invariably be deemed a fraud upon creditors. See
5 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 42, at § 475.
148. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973).
149. Id. § 525.15 (1971).
150. Id. §525.16.
151. A number of states have adopted such statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6111 (Supp. 1974).
152. MINN. STAT. § 528.08 (Supp. 1973).
153. UPC §6-107.
154. See id. It is unlikely that this is the intent of the drafters of the UPC, since such a pro-
vision would be fundamentally inconsistent with the provisions regarding beneficial ownership
during life. Most likely, it is simply a slight ambiguity in the drafting.
155. MINN. STAT. § 528.08 (Supp. 1973).
156. Id. § 528.05; UPC § 6-104.
157. MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973): UPC § 6-104.
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establishing the extent of A's contributions, it would appear logical to assume
that the estate of A should have the burden of proof since B holds the benefit
of the presumptive ownership of the entire account.
Notwithstanding the laudatory intentions of the drafters of the Minnesota
Act, the phrase that they added may have created more ambiguity than it
cured. Particularly troublesome is the use of the term "source." For example,
when a joint account is involved, a party might qualify as the source of funds
even though it could be shown by clear and convincing evidence that he made
a completed inter vivos gift of the funds. 58 Further, a party would qualify as a
source of funds even though he deposited them to repay to the other party
sums which he had previously over-withdrawn. 59 Similarly, where an irrevo-
cable trust account is involved, a party may qualify as the source of funds
even though those funds are beneficially owned by another. 6 ' In each of these
cases, the underlying policies of the Act would appear to dictate that the
estate of the deceased party not be able to invade the funds in question; 6'
yet the face of the Act would appear to permit invasion.
Where the source has made a completed inter vivos gift to the beneficiary
or is repaying over-withdrawals owed to the other party, one could argue
that such a result would not prevail because there had been no "transfer" to
the survivor upon the death of the depositor and absent such a transfer the
provisions of the Act dealing with the rights of creditors are simply inappli-
cable. "'62 If it were not for the fact that such a result would make the language
added by the Minnesota Legislature not only unnecessary but also inopera-
tive, this argument might well be persuasive. Since the decedent cannot
transfer property at his death unless he was the beneficial owner of that prop-
erty during his life,6 3 however, there should be no reason to fear, if this argu-
ment were valid, that the UPC would permit the creditors of one joint party
to invade the net contributions of the other parties. Since it is presumed that
158. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04(a) (Supp. 1973); U PC § 6-103(a).
159. See UPC § 6-103, Comment ("Presumably, overwithdrawal leaves the party making the
excessive withdrawal liable to the beneficial owner as a debtor or trustee.")
160. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04(c) (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103(c).
161. It was the intent of the UPC that creditors of the decedent never be permitted to recover
a share of the account in excess of the interest owned beneficially by the decedent immediately
prior to his death. See PRACTICE MANUAL § 15.5. Since a party may be the source of funds which
far exceed the value of his net contributions, the Minnesota version of the Act subverts that
intent.
162. See MINN. STAT. § 528.08 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-107. "No multiple-party account will
be effective against an estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor sums .. " (emphasis
added).
163. A Pennsylvania court has interpreted a similar statute, permitting a spouse to set aside
certain "conveyances" made by a deceased spouse, so that the surviving spouse could invade a
joint bank account to which decedent and another were parties only to the extent of decedent's
deposits. See Hagy Estate, 15 Pa. Fid. 456, 549 (Orphans' Ct. 1964). It would appear that
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the legislature intended to give effect to every portion of its enactments,'64
then, the statute must be construed in such a manner as to give meaning to
the added language. Thus, the language may well have to be interpreted
to allow the deceased party's estate to recover funds beneficially owned by
the other parties during the decedent's life.
The second problem that arises from the treatment by the Act of the rights
of claimants to the account arises as a result of the failure of the Legislature
to coordinate the borrowed UPC provisions with the existing Minnesota
law. Although enactment of the Multi-Party Accounts Act offered an ex-
cellent opportunity to reevaluate the policy issues which surround the right of
the spouse to satisfy a forced share of the estate from such accounts, 6 ' the
Legislature nevertheless failed to take a fresh look at this recurring problem,
and left the status of the law more unclear than before.
The UPC multi-party accounts article only governs the rights of the spouse
when that spouse is proceeding as a creditor.' Since the "augmented estate"
provisions contained elsewhere in the UPC'67 effectively prevent a person
from disinheriting his spouse by means of a multi-party account, there was
no need for it to do more. The drafters of the UPC apparently contemplated
that it would be enacted as a whole. 66 Minnesota, however, borrowed only
164. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1971). See id. § 645.17(2) which provides that a statute should
not be construed so as to attribute to the Legislature an intent to create an absurd result.
165. Since multi-party bank accounts with rights of survivorship are a convenient and popular
means of evading the spouse's right to a forced share of the estate, the two subjects are
appropriate for simultaneous legislative consideration. See Hines, supra note 1, at 540-41.
166. UPC § 6-107, Comment. The operative statutory language is "statutory allowances."
MINN. STAT. § 528.08 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-107. Under the UPC, the term "statutory allow-
ances" includes "homestead," "family," and "exempt property" allowances, all of which may
be in cash and can, taken together, constitute a rather sizable sum. See UPC §§ 2-401 to -403.
Under Minnesota law, however, the only "statutory allowances" are those authorized during
administration for the maintenance of the spouse and children, which are likely to be a rather
limited sum. See MINN. STAT. § 525.15 (1971). In Minnesota, there is no cash homestead
allowance, but rather the homestead descends free of testamentary or other disposition to the
spouse and children. Id. § 525.145. Similarly, the spouse's right to exempt property is in kind
rather than in cash in Minnesota. Id. § 525.15. In short, the differences between Minnesota law
and the allowances provisions of the UPC mean that the right to invade a multi-party account as
a creditor of decedent's estate is not particularly valuable to the Minnesota surviving spouse.
167. UPC § 2-202(l ). This section of the UPC requires, inter alia, that the estate ofa decedent
be adjusted so as to include property transferred by him to others during his lifetime for less than
a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth if the decedent retained the right to
possession or enjoyment of the property or its income, retained the power to revoke, consume,
invade, or dispose of the property for his own benefit, held it jointly with another person with
right of survivorship, or made large transfers to a small number of persons a short time prior to
his death. The provision is very complex and is carefully designed to prevent the decedent from
disinheriting his spouse by means of non-probate transfers and to prevent a spouse who has
been adequately provided for by non-probate transfers by the decedent from electing a share of
the probate estate. See UPC § 2-202, Comment.
168. The official comment to UPC § 6-107 explains how that section will function almost
solely by means of cross-references to UPC §§ 2-401 to -403.
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the multi-party accounts article "' and left the earlier statute permitting a
surviving spouse to elect against certain non-probate transfers intact. 170
The pre-existing Minnesota statute provides that transfers made by a
decedent during his lifetime may "be treated as a testamentary disposition"
if the decedent retained a power of revocation or appointment over the funds
or retained the power to invade or consume them.'' Further, a section pro-
vides that the spouse may invade transferred funds only when also electing
against the will. 7 Unfortunately, however, the language of the Multi-Party
Accounts Act appears to except all transfers made by means of multi-party
accounts from the operation of the earlier statute. It unambiguously and
clearly states that survivorship rights may only arise from the account con-
tract and that the transfers thus effected "are not to be considered as
testamentary" except where the disposition of funds on deposit is altered by
will.173 While not inconsistent with the augmented estate provisions of the
UPC, which permit invasion of such accounts by the spouse without treat-
ment as testamentary transfers or election against the will,' 74 the language is
in fundamental and direct conflict with the Minnesota statutory provisions
creating the rights of the spouse to elect against non-testamentary transfers.
Since the Multi-Party Accounts Act is more specific and was enacted at a
later date than the statute permitting the spouse to elect against certain non-
probate conveyances, it would appear that the former should be construed as
creating an exception to the general rule established by the latter. 7 5 While
the strict application of the canons of construction might dictate such a
result, however, the policy against allowing a person to disinherit his spouse
remains strong.'76 Presumably the Minnesota court, if its previous ex-
169. Although the Minnesota Legislature adopted large sections of the UPC in 1974, it did
not adopt Article 2, which governs the spouse's rights to elect against non-probate transfers.
See Minn. Laws 1974 ch. 442.
170. MINN. STAT. § 525.213 (1971).
171. Id.
172. Id. §525.215 (Supp. 1973).
173. Id. § 528.07.
174. UPC § 2-202(l). Transfers are includable in the probate estate if made within 2 years of
the decedent's death, but only to the extent that sums in excess of 3,000 dollars are
transferred to one donee in either year. Property held in joint tenancy and property over which
the decedent retained certain powers is also included. Thus, it would seem that the language of
this section is broad enough to comprehend all types of multi-party bank accounts. Further, the
spouse need not treat these as testamentary transfers nor renounce the will, but has an absolute
right to have them included within the probate estate. Id. § 2-206. Instead, property received by
the spouse because of a bequest or devise of decedent is applied in partial satisfaction of the
elective share. Id. § 2-207.
While these differences between the spouse's right to an elective share under Minnesota law
and under the UPC may be largely theoretical and semantic, the fact that the language of the
Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act is consistent with the latter and not with the former may
have very real effects on the rights of the surviving spouse.
175. See note 228 infra and accompanying text.
176. See. e.g., Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 1037
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pressions of opinion as to the equitites are a reliable guide,177 would attempt
to construe the language so as to permit a spouse, particularly a needy one,
access to the funds. 7 Perhaps the court could implement its earlier ex-
pression of approval of the Restatement rule and allow the spouse access to
the funds without labeling the attempted transfer as testamentary.'79 All
that may be said with certainty is that the spouse's rights display less clarity
now than they have at any recent point in time. In the absence of legislative
action, any further statement as to the eventual outcome would only enter the
realm of speculation.
B. Statutory Forms and Change by Will-
An Analysis of the Major Changes from the UPC
Although there are many differences between the UPC and the Minne-
sota Multi-Party Accounts Act,8 0 only two are major in scope and effect.
First, the Minnesota Act includes model signature card forms designed to
assist in resolving some of the hard issues regarding the intent of the parties,
while the UPC would leave these to be litigated on the basis of whatever evi-
dence the contract or conduct of the parties offered.' 8' Second, the Minnesota
Act, unlike the UPC, permits the terms and conditions of multi-party
accounts to be altered by will.
82
In making the first change the Legislature apparently attempted to provide
additional certainty for users of multi-party accounts. The second change in-
creases the flexibility of these accounts. As desirable as that may be, however,
the alterations may well add to the legal and practical problems facing those
who must learn to use the new Act.
1. Statutory Forms and Procedures
The UPC does not expressly eliminate all of the ambiguities which arise
from the use of the joint account form.' Although an account was es-
tablished as "A or B," the parties may have intended that B have the right
(1966). But see Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33
U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1966).
177. See, e.g., Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1964).
The statutory policy against allowing the widow to be left destitute should not be sub-
ordinated to the policy of giving broad effect to savings account trusts, however de-
sirable the latter might be. We cannot overlook the danger that lies in the general use of
Totten trusts as they may affect the surviving spouse. Id. at 196, 130 N.W.2d at 481.
178. The Minnesota court has considered adopting the rule that the spouse's right to invade
non-probate transfers will depend upon financial need. See id. at 191,130 N.W.2d at 479. This is
the so-called "Maryland rule." See, e.g., Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72
(1954).
179. See Estate of Jeruzal v. Jeruzal, 269 Minn. 183, 196, 130 N.W.2d 473, 481-82 (1964).
180. For a discussion of some more minor differences see notes 81 & 115 supra and
accompanying text.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973). This section has no counterpart in the UPC.
182. Compare MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973) with UPC § 6-104(e).
183. See UPC § 6-104(a).
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to make withdrawals only as A's agent." 4 Under the UPC, however, survivor-
ship is presumed, and A's estate could recover the funds only upon a
"clear and convincing" showing that a convenience account was intended."'
The Minnesota Act attempts to ease the estate's burden of proof by
extending the contract theory of analysis adopted by the drafters of the UPC.
Unlike the UPC, it defines a joint account to include only accounts which are
so designated or which are governed by a contract permitting the proceeds to
be paid to any party or the survivor of the parties.8 6 A convenience account,
then, is not a joint account at all within the meaning of the Minnesota Act.
Further, the Act takes advantage of the fact that the parties' intent will
normally be determined by reference to the language of the signature card
which established the account187 by including within the statute itself two
forms to be used by financial institutions for establishing multi-party
accounts. 88
184. This type of account is commonly called a convenience account and is recognized by the
substantive law of most jurisdictions. Some states, however, do not permit the establishment of a
joint account in which one of the parties has no beneficial interest. See UPC § 6-104, Comment.
Minnesota law apparently recognized this account form prior to the adoption of the new Act.
See Rutchick v. Salute, 288 Minn. 258, 179 N.W.2d 607 (1970).
185. UPC§6-104(a).
186. Compare MINN. STAT. § 528.02, subd. 5 (Supp. 1973) with UPC § 6-101(4). The UPC
considers any account which is payable to one of two or more parties to be a joint account, with-
out regard to the designation of the account or whether the contract mentions survivorship rights.
187. See MINN. STAT. § 528.06 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-105.
188. MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973) states:
The declared purpose of sections 528.01 to 528.16 is to render certainty to the nature
of accounts of deposit in relation to the rights of survivorship, and to distinguish ac-
counts of survivorship from accounts established for the purpose of having an agent
with power to draw on the account for the convenience of the owner with no survivor-
ship rights in the agent. To further accomplish this purpose, the forms contained in this
section are recommended for use to be kept on file in the depository financial institu-
tion. Deposits made using a form of account containing the following language signed
by the depositor shall be conclusive evidence of the intent of decedent to establish a
survivorship account in the absence of fraud or mispreresentation, subject, nevertheless,
to other disposition made by will specifically referring to the account as otherwise pro-
vided in section 528.05, clause (e), the form to read as follows:"The undersigned signators of this account hereby acknowledge that the depositor
or depositors, both as to the original deposit and any subsequent deposits, intend that
such funds as may constitute the account balance upon the death of any party to this
account, shall be the property of the surviving party or parties who shall take as a sur-
viving joint tenant.
If two or more persons shall be the survivors, their interests shall continue to be held
as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Where no rights of survivorship are intended and the account is one to be established
for convenience only between a depositor and his agent, the following language is
recommended for use, and when so used, any account deposited in the form shall be
contrued as a matter of law to be an account subject to a power of attorney with no
survivorship rights, the form to read as follows:
"I ............ (grantor of power), hereby constitute and appoint ..........
(grantee of power), as my attorney in fact, to deposit or withdraw funds held in .......
(name of bank), in account # ............
Dated:
Acknowledgment: In the presence of ............ (an authorized person) .........
(name of financial institution)."
The power so granted is subject to the provisions of section 528.16.
1974]
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The form for the convenience account grants the second party nothing
more than a power of attorney over the account. 9 As a matter of law, no
ownership rights will vest in him by reason of his survivorship. 190 The limited
power of attorney created by signing the account form does not supplant the
common law general power of attorney but merely supplements it.' 9' Though
its use is limited to convenience accounts,'92 the durability of the statutory
power of attorney makes it unique. The power, once created by the opening of
the account, will endure until it is revoked by the grantor, the account is
terminated, the grantor dies, or a guardian of the estate of the decedent is
appointed. 9 Even the appointment of a conservator may not terminate the
power.' 9' A convenience account, then, may be administered by the holder of
the power, notwithstanding the present incompetency of the grantor, unless
he has actually been adjudicated an incompetent.'95 A common law power of
attorney, on the other hand, automatically terminates upon the incompetency
of the grantor, whether or not adjudicated.'96
The use of the statutory joint account form constitutes conclusive evidence
of the depositor's intent to create rights of survivorship. 97 Consequently, if
the surviving joint party offers such a signature card as evidence in an action
to determine the ownership of the account after the death of the depositor,
the decedent's estate could not establish that he had in fact had a contrary
intent. The net effect of this "conclusive evidence rule" is to establish the
intent to create survivorship rights as a fact rebuttable only by a showing of
the survivor's fraud or misrepresentation.
99
A similar conclusive presumption is created by a New Jersey statute
governing the rights of the parties to joint accounts. 9 9 It provides that when-
ever a party has made a deposit to a joint account, "such person shall be con-
clusively presumed to intend to vest in the other a present beneficial






194. Id. § 525.54 authorizes the appointment of a conservator over the estate of a person who
is unable to manage his property but who is not actually incompetent. Id. § 525.614 states that
the term "guardian" includes conservator whenever used in "this chapter." The words "this
chapter" refer to Chapter 525. Since the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act is designated as
Chapter 528, appointment of a conservator may not automatically terminate the power of attor-
ney. If it does not, however, the conservator will apparently be a party, in place of the conserva-
tee. See id. § 528.02, subd. 8.
195. Id. § 528.16.
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1957).
197. MINN. STAT. §528.15 (Supp. 1973).
198. Id.
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to preclude the introduction of evidence of the depositor's intent.201 It would
appear that Minnesota should follow this rule. Although the language of the
Minnesota statute differs slightly from that of New Jersey,'"' the effect of
the two statutes is the same. The Minnesota statute should be interpreted to
mean that the ownership of the account will be controlled by the statutory
form as a matter of law.
20 3
The statutory joint account form further provides that if there are two or
more surviving parties, they shall take as joint tenants with the right of sur-
vivorship.0 4 Although the Act appears to produce that result without regard
to the intent of the parties, 20 5 the form will be instrumental in informing the
depositor of the ultimate disposition of the account at his death.2"0
Although the forms offer certainty, they may also give rise to some prob-
lems. Where the signature card, provided to the customer by the financial
institution, is not in the precise statutory form, its evidentiary weight is un-
certain. Though the forms are merely "recommended," it is the use of the pre-
cise language which has legal effect.0 7 Consequently, where the language of
the signature card differs from the statutory language, the parties may be
compelled to litigate the case according to the rebuttable presumption of
survivorship, which, under both the UPC and the Minnesota Act, can be
overcome only by "clear and convincing" proof.2 00 Thus, if a convenience
account was in fact desired, the intent of the parties may be frustrated.
Although "clear and convincing" evidence is not defined in the statute nor
in any reported case interpreting the comparable UPC provision, cases con-
sidering other written instruments may offer a clue to its meaning. In other
contexts, that degree of proof has been the subject of much discussion and
litigation.2 9 The Minnesota Supreme Court, discussing the degree of proof
that would be necessary to reform a written contract by parol evidence,2
10
stated that evidence to be "clear and convincing" must be "more than a
fair preponderance of the evidence" but need not constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 11 The degree of proof necessary to prove the true intent of
201. Ward v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. 132, 183 A.2d 60 (1962).
202. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-218B (1963) with MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973).
203. Peterson, Recent Probate Legislation, 41 HENNEPIN LAWYER, July-August, 1973, at 4, 6.
204. MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973).
205. Id. § 528.05(a).
206. The use of the form is particularly important in that the new Act changes the survivor's
rights to funds in the account. Prior case law held that the survivors would take the account
as tenants in common, and the new Act permits the parties to take the account as joint tenants.
See notes 123 to 125 supra and accompanying text.
207. MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973).
208. Id. § 528.05(a); UPC. § 6-104(a).
209. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 120, § 340; J. WIGMORE, supra note 120, § 2498.
210. Kavanagh v. Golden Rule, 226 Minn. 510, 33 N.W.2d 697 (1948).
211. Id. at 517, 33 N.W.2d at 701. See also Dwyer v. Illinois Oil Co., 190 Minn. 616, 252
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the depositor may not be capable of totally objective definition."' It has been
argued that the best definition of "clear and convincing" may be "highly
probable, '2 3 although this too is an inexact term. What is certain is that the
parties should take advantage of the statutory forms, particularly where they
wish to establish a convenience account. If the forms are copied verbatim from
the statute, the rights of the parties will be fixed. If not, they may be forced to
litigate under a degree of proof that is imprecise at best.
Even if a financial institution routinely employs both statutory forms, con-
fusion may still result, if through mistake or ignorance, the parties to one
account are allowed to sign both forms. Although this may appear unlikely, it
was not uncommon prior to the adoption of the Act for a financial institution
to require execution of two forms when the customer was granting a power of
attomley over the account." 4 One signature card was used to establish the
account and contained both parties' signatures, and the other form was
placed on file to evidence the attorney-in-fact's power. The forms found in the
statute are intended to be alternative. If both are signed, the resulting conflict
would not be simple to resolve, although the terms of the convenience form
would probably prevail.
2 15
A final problem may arise with regard to the durable power of attorney
granted when a convenience account is established. While the flexibility of the
durable power may be desirable in most situations, the Act does not give the
grantor the option to choose a non-durable power. 216
In some circumstances the durable power may not afford adequate pro-
tection for the incompetent depositor's estate.217 Thus, the convenience form
should be used with caution and perhaps should be avoided where the grantor
is elderly or infirm. In any event, the person to whom the power is to be
212. Although a number of courts have attempted to do so, their formulations appear equally
as vague as "clear and convincing." See, e.g., Finucan v. Kendig, 109 11. 198, 206 (1884) ("most
satisfactory kind [of evidence]"); In re Estate of Dzierski, 449 Pa. 285, 288, 296 A.2d 716, 718
(1972) ("clear, strong, or compelling"); In re Estate of Beniger, 449 Pa. 373, 377, 296 A.2d 773,
776 (1972) ("clear, precise, and convincing").
213. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degree of Belief 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 254 (1944).
214. The forms reproduced in Appendix A were routinely used in combination by the North-
western National Bank of Minneapolis, Minnesota.
215. MINN. STAT. § 528.15 (Supp. 1973) provides that if thejoint account form is used it "shall
be conclusive evidence of the intent of the decedent to establish a survivorship account ...."
while the use of the convenience form "shall be construed as a matter of law to be an account
subject to a power of attorney. .. "
216. MINN. STAT. § 528.16 (Supp. 1973).
217. A better approach might have been to pattern the provision after the durable power-of-
attorney section of the UPC's article regarding persons under a disability. That provision per-
mits the grantor of a power to elect whether he wishes it to be durable and requires the inclusion
of affirmative language to produce durability. UPC § 5-501. This section has been praised for its
efficiency and flexibility, for it offers protection for the estate of the disabled person under most
circumstances, while at the same time allowing the person with special needs-one who soon ex-
pects to become disabled or one who will be sent overseas in the armed forces, for example-to in-
clude a durability provision. See PRACTICE MANUAl § 14.37.
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granted should obviously be chosen with great care.
On balance, the addition of the statutory forms appears to be an advantage.
If the forms are carefully used, the desired result can be obtained with greater
ease than under the UPC. Moreover, since the use of the forms is optional,
the parties may, if they prefer, treat the account as if the UPC provisions had
been enacted without amendment.
2. Change by Will
The Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act takes its greatest departure
from the UPC when it permits a party to alter by will the disposition of sums
owned beneficially by him prior to his death. To the section of the UPC
governing survivorship rights in joint accounts, the Minnesota Act added the
phrase emphasized in the following quotation:
(a) Sums remaining on deposit at death of a party to a joint account belong
to the surviving party or parties as against the estate of the decedent unless
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention, or there is a
different disposition made by a valid will as herein provided, specifically re-
ferring to such account."'
In addition, a section of the UPC which expressly prohibited testamentary
alteration of survivorship rights arising under the account contract or the
terms of the act2"' was replaced by language permitting a party to make such
changes "by specific reference by will. 22 0
Whether the Legislature intended by these amendments to the UPC to per-
mit alteration of the survivorship features of all types of multi-party accounts
or only of joint accounts is somewhat unclear. Although the Act contains
three separate sections establishing survivorship rights, one for each of the
three types of multi-party accounts, only the section governing joint accounts
states that the rights it creates are subject to alteration by will. 22I The
omission of similar language in the section relating to P.O.D. accounts gives
rise to the inference that the survivorship rights there created are abso-
lute 2 2 A similar inference might arise from the omission of language per-
mitting different disposition by will in the section governing trust accounts.
2 3
218. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(a) (Supp. 1973).
219. UPC § 6-104(e).
220. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973).
221. Id. § 528.05(a).
222. See id. § 528.05(b). The Minnesota Supreme Court follows the canon of construction
which provides that when the legislature expressly includes one item in a statute, it means to ex-
clude all others. See Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Local 63, 233 Minn. 144,
45 N.W.2d 797 (1951); Maytag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 218 Minn. 460, 17 N.W.2d 37
(1944); Northwestern Hosp. v. Public Bldg. Serv. Employes' Union, Local 113, 208 Minn. 389,
294 N.W. 215 (1940),
Where a statute enumerates the person or things to be affected by its provisions, there is
an implied exclusion of others. (citations omitted] The maxim operates conversely
where the statute designates an exception, proviso, savings clause, or a negative so that
the exclusion of one thing includes all others. Maytag Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation,
supra at 463, 17 N.W.2d at 40.
223. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05(c) (Supp. 1973). The principles of statutory construction
1974]
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In that case, however, the caveat that clear and convincing evidence of the in-
tent of the depositor will control the disposition of the funds might be in-
terpreted to permit the introduction into evidence of a will calling for a
disposition different than that otherwise resulting under the terms of the
account contract and the Act.1
24
The general alteration-by-will section of the Act, on the other hand, does
not purport to limit the types of alterations which may be made. The UPC
provisions that it replaced described in broad language the changes pro-
scribed, 221 and in reversing the effect of that language, the Minnesota Legisla-
ture left it as inclusive as before.2 2 6 On its face, then, the section appears to
permit alteration not only of the beneficiary or payee designation of a trust or
P.O.D. account, but also of the survivorship terms, so that the depositor
might, for example, revoke a trust or P.O.D. account in his will. 227
Although the canons of construction offer some assistance in ascertaining
the scope of the alteration-by-will provisions of the Act, they provide no hard
and fast answers. The canons would resolve an irreconcilable conflict in favor
of the specific rather than the general provision, 2 s but they also direct that the
provision later in position controls when two portions of the same enactment
cannot be harmonized.
2 29
Thus, the resolution of the two conflicting constructional preferences is a
prerequisite to construing the change-by-will provisions of the Act.2 0 In the
end, whether the Act is interpreted to permit the testator to alter all survivor-
ship rights arising out of a multi-party account, whatever its form, will de-
pend upon what the court determines to have been the legislative intent. 31
Assuming that this threshhold question is resolved in favor of permitting
involved here are the same as in the case of trust and P.O.D. accounts. See discussion and au-
thorities collected note 222 supra.
224. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05(c) (Supp. 1973).
225. UPC § 6-104(e) forbids alteration of "a right of survivorship arising from the express
terms of the account or under this section, a beneficiary designation in a trust account, or a
P.O.D. payee designation."
226. Compare MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973) with UPC § 6-104(e).
227. See MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973).
228. MINN. STAT. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1971). See State v. Kalvig, 296 Minn. 395, 209 N.W.2d
678 (1973); Ehlert v. Graue, 292 Minn. 393, 195 N.W.2d 823 (1972); Schultz v. Ruiz, 281 Minn.
281, 161 N.W.2d 537 (1968); Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 115 N.W.2d 22
(1962); Fox v. Swartz, 228 Minn. 233, 36 N.W.2d 708 (1949); Wolner v. State Dep't of Social
Security, 213 Minn. 96, 5 N.W.2d 67 (1942); Judd v. Landin, 211 Minn. 465, 1 N.W.2d 861
(1942); Rosenquist v. O'Neill & Preston, 187 Minn. 375, 245 N.W. 621 (1933).
229. MINN. STAT. § 645.26, subd. 2 (1971). See Op. MINN. ATT'Y GEN. 980-A (March 21,
1952).
230. There appears to be some authority for the proposition that a specific provision governs
a general even though both are in the same law and the general follows the specific in date or
position. Cf Butler v. Engel, 243 Minn. 317,334-35, 68 N.W.2d 226, 237-38 (1954).
231. See Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 129, 84 N.W. 788, 789 (1901): "[Clanons
of construction are not the masters of the courts, but merely their servants, to aid them in as-
certaining the legislative intent."
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alteration of all types of survivorship rights arising under all three types of
accounts, it is necessary to determine whether the power also applies to ir-
revocable trust accounts . 32 It would seem that the beneficiary designation
and survivorship rights attaching to this particular account should be in-
alterable regardless of the general rule. 3' Such a construction of the Act can
be justified, not only because a specific provision is to control over a general
one,134 but also because the Legislature could not have intended to authorize
an irrevocable trust account while at the same time providing a procedure for
its revocation.1
35
Until its scope is litigated, the power to alter by will must be used with
caution. Nevertheless, it is a valuable estate planning device which furthers-
the Act's goal of permitting the parties to effectuate their intent. Assume A is
married to B and the majority of A's assets are in joint tenancy with B.
Estate planning considerations may dictate that the joint accounts pass under
A's will.223 Rather than rely on A to change the ownership of the accounts
after signing the will, counsel may insert a clause in the will altering the dis-
position of the accounts. This precaution assures that the estate plan will not
232. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04(c) (Supp. 1973).
233. For a general discussion of irrevocable trusts and the rights attaching to them see 3 P-H
EST. PLAN. 4102 (197 1).
234. See authorities collected note 228 supra.
235. The Legislature is presumed to intend that all portions of its enactments have an
effect and that no absurd result will accrue. MINN. STAT. §§ 645.16, .17 (1971).
236. This and similar estate planning decisions regarding the use of joint accounts will often
turn upon the tax consequences which will flow from the various methods of passing property
upon death. While the tax consequences arising from the use of multi-party accounts are beyond
the scope of this note, some aspects of the subject may be mentioned in passing.
A joint bank account between spouses may be responsible for a larger estate tax liability than
necessary. Problems may arise where such an arrangement exists and the husband has provided
by will for a formula marital deduction. See I A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 791-97 (3d ed.
1961). If the husband later converts separately held property into a joint account with his wife,
she may receive much more than the one-half of the adjusted gross estate which is the maxi-
mum marital deduction. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. This results in double taxation when
the same property is later taxed to the wife's estate.
Since the Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act permits the depositor to bequeath specifically
the contents o1 the joint account, it may provide a solution for this dilemma. See MINN. STAT. §
528.05 (Supp. 1973). The depositor may maintain a joint account with his spouse during their
joint lifetimes, but provide a formula clause in his will bequeathing to his wife only so much of
the joint account as is required to reach one half of the adjusted gross estate. Such a technique
is advantageous, for it permits the testator to maintain joint accounts, giving his spouse access
to the funds during his life without impairing his estate plan.
Tax considerations may also attain great importance where an irrevocable trust is established
or an inter vivos gift made by means of a joint account. In the past, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has taken the position that creation of a multi-party bank account does not constitute a
completed gift from the depositor to the other party until the second party withdraws funds from
the account for his own benefit without any obligation to account to the depositor for the with-
drawal. The test is whether the depositor can regain possession of the entire fund without the con-
sent of the other party. See Rev. Rul. 69-148, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 226.
The irrevocable trust account option created by the new Act may well permit the depositor to
1974]
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be thwarted by A's physical inability to change the accounts, procrastination,
forgetfulness, or sudden death. In addition, it provides a method to change
title to the accounts where A may be reluctant to do so during his lifetime for
fear of family quarrels. Further, the depositor may allow the other joint party
access to the funds during his lifetime without waiving his right to make a
different disposition of the account upon his death.
Despite its obvious usefulness, the power of alteration by will may result in
litigation and uncertainty for two interrelated reasons. First, the right to
exercise the power is dependent upon compliance with certain statutory pro-
cedures, some of which are impractical or onerous. Second, the historic prob-
lems surrounding the disposition of bank accounts by will, which were
eliminated by the UPC's decision to forbid alteration by will, are necessarily
revived by the Minnesota Act. Those most likely to give rise to litigation are
divest himself of beneficial interest in the account to such an extent that a deposit constitutes a
completed gift. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2503. Under the regulations, the general test of
whether a transfer constitutes a taxable gift is whether "the donor has so parted with dominion
and control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition whether for his own benefit or
the benefit of another ... " Treas. Reg. § 25.251 l-2(b) (1974).
Such consequences may not be entirely undesirable if the transfer is sufficiently complete so
that the value of sums deposited need not be included in the depositor's gross estate and sub-
jected to an estate tax at his death. There is, however, a possibility that the use of the irrevocable
trust account will subject the funds to multiple taxation under both the gift and estate tax pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Arguably, the sums deposited in an irrevocable trust account are includable in decedent's gross
estate by reason of the provision requiring the inclusion of transfers taking effect at death. Funds
so transfered are includable if the decedent retains a reversionary interest in the property and
that interest has a value in excess of 5 percent of the total property. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
2037. Though sums on deposit in an irrevocable trust account belong beneficially to the benefici-
ary during the lives of the parties it is not entirely clear that the beneficiary's estate is entitled to
possession and enjoyment of the property if he predeceases the trustee. Arguably, in that event
the sums on deposit in the account revert to the trustee. The financial institution is clearly not
protected if it pays funds to a beneficiary unless he shows that he has survived all trustees. See
MINN. STAT. § 528.12 (Supp. 1973). Yet, according to the terms of the Act, such provisions are
not to govern the rights of the parties inter se. Id. § 528.03. At best, the statute is ambiguous
and its coordination with the provisions of the tax laws is incomplete.
Similar problems may arise where the depositor attempts to make an irrevocable gift by
means of a joint account. The tax laws provide that the gross estate of a decedent includes the
value of all joint tenancy bank accounts unless the sums on deposit originally belonged to the sur-
viving joint tenant and were not acquired from the deceased joint tenant for less than a full and
adequate consideration in money or money's worth. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
The fact that the decedent made an irrevocable gift during his life of sums on deposit will not
alter the result, since the provision governing joint interests operates without regard to beneficial
ownership. Id. Thus, double taxation can easily occur.
Double taxation may also occur where a gift is made by means of either an irrevocable trust
account or a joint account within 3 years of the depositor's death. Such transfers are deemed in
contemplation of death and result in double taxation. See id. § 2035.
It is apparent from even a superficial consideration of the issues that a multi-party bank
account is a complex and perhaps dangerous vehicle for an irrevocable gift. The problems dis-
cussed here are only a few of the obvious issues, and attorneys should scrutinize carefully the
tax consequences of their clients' multi-party accounts.
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discussed below. Their existence suggests that the simple expedient of altering
the disposition of the account by written notice to the financial institution
during the depositor's life should be used in most cases.
a. The Requirement of Notice to the Financial Institution
As a practical matter, altering the disposition of a multi-party account by
will requires that prompt notice of the change be given to the financial institu-
tion upon the death of the testator. Unless it has received written notice that a
beneficiary under the will has made a claim,2 37 the financial institution will be
protected if it pays the proceeds of the account to any named party, bene-
ficiary, or payee.23 1 Obviously, if notice of the alteration is not given immedi-
ately after death, a surviving party, payee, or beneficiary will have an
opportunity to reach funds that he in fact does not own.
Unfortunately, immediate notice may be impractical in most cases.
Although the personal representative of the decedent has a duty to give such
notice,239 by the time he has been appointed, 240 it may well be too late. 241 A
determined party, beneficiary, or payee will have had time to withdraw the
funds. Though decedent's counsel could give the notice, he too may fail to
learn of the death, locate the will, and discover that notice should be given
before the sums have been withdrawn. 2 2 If a copy of the will is not on file in
the office of decedent's attorney, there will be an even longer delay before its
provisions come to the attention of anyone legally or morally obligated to
give notice. 243 In short, the power to alter by will may have little practical
value unless precautions are taken to assure that the account is not pre-
maturely depleted.
The obvious solution is to notify the financial institution immediately upon
execution of the will that survivorship rights have been altered and that the
funds in the account are not to be disbursed to the surviving joint party, bene-
ficiary, or payee unless decedent's personal representative notifies the fi-
nancial institution that the will has been revoked or altered. Although such
237. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973).
238. See id. § 528.09-.13 (Supp. 1973); UPC §6-108 to -112.
239. This is true both under present Minnesota law and under the administration article of
the UPC which has been enacted in Minnesota to take effect August 1, 1975. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 524.3-703(a) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
240. Under MINN. STAT. §§ 525.23, .83 (1971), filing of the petition to prove the will and
publication of notice requires a minimum of 3 to 4 weeks.
241. The adoption of the administration article of the UPC will have some effect here. Pro-
vision is made for the appointment of a special administrator, informally and without notice or
hearing, when necessary to protect the estate of the decedent prior to the appointment of the
personal representative. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.3-614 to -618 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
This provision will make it theoretically possible to obtain an appointment within a few hours
after decedent's death. Nevertheless, that may be a sufficient lapse of time that the administrator
will lose the race to the bank to a surviving party.
242. See L. JOHNSON & R. REISTER, MINNESOTA ESTATE ADMINISTRATION § 1.3 (1968).
243. See id.
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notice should obviously be given, the testator and his counsel should not
assume that the financial institution will be bound thereby.
While the financial institution generally will not be protected if it pays out
after having received notice by a party that funds should not be paid accord-
ing to the term of the account,244. there is additional language in the Act which
indicates that this rule may not apply to written notice of a change made in an
ambulatory will.24 5 Arguably, notice of change by will is effective only if
given after decedent's death when one or more beneficiaries under the will
have a present right to make claims against the account. 4 ' If the benefits
which could accrue from the use of the change by will provisions of the Act are
to be realized, the statute should be amended to assure that inter vivos
notice is effective against the financial institution. While the record keeping
required by this rule might be substantial, it appears the most equitable of
the alternatives.
2 47
b. Access to the Funds by the Beneficiary Under the Will
One of the advantages of the multi-party bank account as a method of
transferring property on death is that it permits the survivor prompt access to
the proceeds without the necessity for time-consuming and expensive probate
procedures. 24 Permitting the depositor to alter the disposition of the funds in
244. See MINN. STAT. § 528.13 (Supp. 1973).
245. MINN. STAT. § 528.13 (Supp. 1973) provides that the protection given financial institu-
tions does not extend to payments made after notice from a party entitled to present payment
from the account that the terms of the account contract will not be honored. This appears to be
a reference to the written notice which a party is entitled to give to require the financial institu-
tion to alter the terms of the account or to stop an otherwise authorized payment. Id. § 528.06.
Obviously, a potential beneficiary under an ambulatory will is not a party until the death of the
testator, because he has no right to demand present payment from the account until that time.
See id. § 528.01, subd. 8.
246. The general sections of the Act which protect the financial institution permit payment to
parties and to surviving named payees and beneficiaries with apparent impunity, unless the
institution has received written notice by a party. See MINN. STAT. §§ 528.10-.13 (Supp. 1973).
Where the personal representatives of a deceased party make a claim against the account,
however, the financial institution is directed to proceed in accordance with the alteration-by-will
provisions of the Act. Id. §§ 528.10-.12. Those sections provide that an alteration by will is not
binding upon a financial institution unless it has received written notice of a claim by a benefi-
ciary. Id. § 528.05(e). This language, too, casts doubt upon the right of a potential beneficiary
named in an ambulatory will to file a binding notice, since he has no right to make a present
claim, and since he would probably be unable to prove that the testator had not revoked
the will or would not revoke it in the future.
247. An alternative solution is to amend the statute to require that funds in multi-party ac-
counts be frozen for a period of time after the death of the depositor to permit filing of notices
of change by will. This alternative, however, is probably less desirable than the first, since it might
prove an unnecessary hardship where the surviving party is clearly entitled to the sums on deposit
and has no other assets.
248. J. CORCORAN, ALTERNATIVES TO PROBATE § 6.5 (1972).
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the account by will necessarily sacrifices that advantage.
First, the alternative disposition must be made by "valid will,""9 a term
left undefined by the Act. Under present law a will is not valid until de-
termined to be so by the probate court.25 1 If the will is contested or another
instrument offered in opposition to the first, a final determination of validity
will not be made until the appeal has been taken and rejected. 2 ' In other
words, this requirement alone may freeze the funds in the account for months
or even years.
25 2
Minnesota's adoption of the administration articles of the UPC may par-
tially alleviate this problem. Under the terms of the UPC, a will is valid if so
declared by an informal probate order, an adjudication by the probate court,
and, if there is no litigation involving the rights of succession or the will, even
the unprobated will "may be admitted as evidence of a devise. 2 3 Although
the UPC would not necessarily reduce the delay in the event of an actual will
contest, it would most certainly do so in an ordinary case.
2
14
The problem of access to the funds, however, flows not so much from the
valid-will requirement as it does from the limitation upon the extent to which
sums on deposit may be transferred by will. Although survivorship rights
under the Act are generally determined without reference to the beneficial
ownership of the parties during life,2 55 the amount which may be transfered by
will is limited to the sums owned beneficially by the testator during his
lifetime.26 Thus, the Act requires that the funds in the account be frozen until
"an order has been made by the probate court adjudicating the decedent's
interest disposable by will. ' 257 The enactment of the administration pro-
visions of the UPC does little to mitigate this problem.
While the Multi-Party Accounts Act does not totally preclude the use of
informal probate or unsupervised administration where the testator has
altered the disposition of an account by will, they do at least require that the
249. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(a) (Supp. 1973).
250. Id. §525.243 (1971).
251. Id. § 525.714. The probate court order is suspended during the appeal process.
252. The time involved is usually quite substantial. MINN. STAT. § 525.24 (1971) provides for
a hearing on the petition to prove the will upon 3 weeks published notice. Id. § 525.81. The
original hearing may be continued by the probate court to allow for the filing of objections. Id.
§ 525.241. After an order or judgment by the probate court, the question still may not be finally
determined until the appeal process has been concluded. Id. §§ 525.71-.74.
253. MINN. STAT. ANN. 524.3-102 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
254. If formal probate is necessary due to a dispute over the will, even though that dispute is
unrelated to the multi-party bank account, the delay will probably be nearly as substantial under
the new law as under the old. The adoption of the administration provisions of the UPC does not
repeal or alter the appeal procedures of present law. Since the order is suspended while appeal
is taken, it would appear that distribution of the bank account would continue to be delayed until
after an appeal had been taken. See MINN. STAT. ANN. ch. 524 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
255. MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973).
256. Id. § 528.05(e).
257. Id.
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administration of the estate be terminated by formal proceedings.
2 58 It is only
by the use of this process that the required factual determination can be
made.259 Formal termination requires notice and a hearing at which the pro-
bate court takes evidence, construes the will, adjudicates questions of fact,




Not only is the added procedural requirement a burden, but determining
beneficial ownership during life may be troublesome, particularly in the case
of the joint account, where inter vivos ownership is based upon net contribu-
tions to the account.2"' In the event of a failure of proof as to net contributions,





While the procedure required may not be as time-consuming or complex
as formal probate, it is far more burdensome than the unsupervised adminis-
tration and informal termination which would have been available had the
testator made an ordinary bequest rather than a bequest of sums on deposit in
a multi-party account. 22 Since efficiency is one of the chief advantages of the
multi-party account, it is ironic that these provisions of the Act may make
the disposition of proceeds of the account more complex than the administra-
tion of an ordinary will.
c. The Specific Reference Requirement
The disposition of bank accounts by will traditionally involves problems
of identification. 214 While these would be eliminated by the UPC's decision to
forbid alteration by will, the Minnesota Act perpetuates them, requiring
a new disposition to be made "by specific reference by will." ' 26 Unfortunately,
258. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1002 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
259. See id. The Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act requires that the probate court deter-
mine the interest of the decedent in the proceeds of the account. MINN. STAT. § 528.05(e) (Supp.
1973). Obviously, such a determination and the accompanying order will require a hearing in
the probate court.
260. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1002 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). The procedure permits a deter-
mination of questions of fact upon notice and hearing without the need to make an accompanying
determination on the question of testacy.
261. See MINN. STAT. § 528.04 (Supp. 1973); UPC § 6-103.
262. In no event may formal termination proceedings be had until the time for presenting
claims which arose prior to death has expired. Further, if the devisee of the account makes the
petition he must wait until I year after the appointment of the personal representative. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1002 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). In Minnesota, the time for presenting claims is
60 days. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-104 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974). Thus, the total time elapsed will
be significant even if the hearing is a simple one. Where failure of proof as to net contributions re-
quires a more complex hearing, possibly involving lengthy continuances, the submission of
memoranda of law, and appeals, even more time can be expected to elapse.
263. In the case of an ordinary bequest, the UPC would permit the personal representative to
close the estate by verified statement, without hearing, as early as 6 months after the date of his
appointment. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.3-1003 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
264. See 4 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 33.34 (3d ed. rev. 1961).
265. MINN. STAT. 528.05(e) (Supp. 1973).
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the Act gives no indication of the specificity of language required, nor is there
any Minnesota case law which sheds light on the subject. It seems safe to
conjecture that language such as "all residue" 6 ' or "all my bank accounts"
will be insufficient to change ownership of the account, but the adequacy of
less general phrases is difficult to determine. The specific reference require-
ment is in reality two-fold. First, the language must be sufficiently specific to
demonstrate the testator's intent to change the disposition of the account.
Second, it must be sufficiently specific to permit identification of the account.
A series of New York and Pennsylvania cases dealing with revocation of
Totten trusts may give some guidance in determining whether the intent
aspect of the requirement is met.2"7 The New York Court of Appeals, for ex-
ample, has held the following language sufficient to revoke a Totten trust:
"The proceeds of a bank account presently on deposit at the Bronx Savings
Bank, Pelham Parkway Branch, I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my
friends ... in equal shares to do with as they see fit.26s Arguably, the language
must be at least this specific before a court will find that the testator intended
to revoke a trust. The Pennsylvania court, for example, has found an ex-
pression of the testatrix's intent to omit a niece from her will because of her
prior cancellation of a debt owed her by that niece insufficient to revoke a
Totten trust in the niece's favor.6 The same court held inadequate language
which expressed the testatrix's desire to dispose of all of her property by that
will and to nullify all prior wills, testaments, and writings in the nature of a
will.2 7 0
Determining whether the account itself has been adequately identified may
be slightly less troublesome than determining whether there is a specific
expression of the testator's intent. If, for example, the will purports to convey
an account at A BC bank, while the testator has an account only at A B bank,
266. See In re Basch's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 773, 246 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sur. Ct. 1964).
267. See, e.g., In re Beck's Estate, 260 App. Div. 651, 23 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1940) (will dis-
inheriting the beneficiary of a tentative bank account trust held to revoke the trust accounts
when testatrix had no other assets, even though the will did not specifically mention the bank
accounts); In re Basch's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 773, 246 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sur. Ct. 1964); in re
Richardson's Estate, 134 Misc. 174, 235 N.Y.S. 747 (Sur. Ct. 1929) (verbal declarations of
testator admissible to show intent to revoke Totten trust accounts by will); In re Beagan's
Estate, 112 Misc. 292, 183 N.Y.S. 941 (Sur. Ct. 1920) (will held to revoke Totten trust where
legacies could only be satisfied from the bank account as decedent had no other assets); In re
Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 A. 106 (1933) (specific reference in will to account at named
bank held to revoke Totten trust); In re Krewson's Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A.2d 250
(1944) (neither oral statements by decedent nor an unsigned document were sufficient to revoke
Totten trust, nor was a will provision that cancellation of a debt was sufficient remembrance
of a niece); In re Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 A. 209 (1936) (follows In re Richard-
son's Estate, supra).
268. In re Stein's Will. 42 Misc. 2d 787, 249 N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sur. Ct. 1964). Cf Meehan v.
Emigrant Say. Bank, 213 App. Div. 807, 208 N.Y.S. 325 (1925), affd, 241 N.Y. 564, 150 N.E.
556.
269. In re Krewson's Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A.2d 250 (1944).
270. In re Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super. 93, 188 A. 209 (1936).
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there is some authority which would permit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to show that the account at AB bank was intended."7 ' Similarly,
where the testator bequeaths his account at ABC bank and is a party to more
than one account at that institution, the Minnesota court would probably
admit extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.27 2 Nevertheless, the court
cannot rewrite the will. If a provision is so ambiguous that extrinsic evidence
will not clarify the intent of the testator, the bequest will fail,273 and the ac-
count will pass to the surviving party, payee, or beneficiary.274
If the change-by-will provisions of the Act are to be used to their best
advantage, care must be taken to assure that the bequest does not fail for lack
of specificity. The testator and his counsel should be certain that the intent to
alter the disposition is clearly and unambiguously expressed and that the
account is referred to not only by its form and by the name of the financial
institution but also by the account number. Conversely, where the testator
does not wish to alter the disposition of funds in an existing multi-party
account, but does wish to bequeath other accounts by will, the instrument
must be carefully drafted to avoid involving the multi-party account in a will
contest.
d. Ademption
The decision to permit bequests of funds in multi-party accounts necessarily
admits the possibility that such bequests will be adeemed by extinction.7
The attendant problems are similar to those which arise out of the ademption
of any specific bequest of a bank account.27
Ademption by extinction occurs where a specific bequest of real or personal
271. In re Vetroock's Will, 34 Misc. 2d 1073, 230 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sur. Ct. 1962), deciding
a similar issue, held that accounts described as in the Onondaga Savings Bank were specifically
identifiable and that the testator had intended accounts at Onondaga County Savings Bank,
since extrinsic evidence established that there were no other financial institutions in the area that
might fit the description.
272. See In re Swenson's Estate, 55 Minn. 300, 56 N.W. 1115 (1893), where the meaning
of the words "heirs-at-law," as used in a will, was in dispute, the court stated: "[T]he construc-
tion [of the phrase] seem[s] to rest and to be predicated upon an ascertainment of the testator's
intention from the words used, from the context of the instrument and from the surrounding
circumstances." Id. at 310, 56 N.W. at 1117.
273. See In re Henrikson's Estate, 163 Minn. 176, 179, 203 N.W. 778, 779 (1927). See
generally Rollison & Anderson, Problems of Construction of Wills, 32 ALA. L. REV. 52 (1971).
274. MINN. STAT. § 528.05 (Supp. 1973).
275. See generally T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 134 (2d ed. 1953); G. THOMPSON, WILLS §§ 516,
519 (3d ed. 1947); Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 1943 Wis. L. REV. 11;
Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Smiting Lord Thurlow's Ghost. 2 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 195
(1971); Smith, Ademption by Extinction, 6 Wis. L. REV. 229 (1931); Warren, The History
of Ademption. 25 IOWA L. REV. 290 (1940).
276. The intangibility and ease of division which attend such accounts add special problems
in the area of ademption. While more tangible and distinct property, such as land or goods, is
usually most conveniently treated as a whole, with joint accounts it is often difficult after mul-
tiple transfers, parties, and banks to determine whether the bequest in question has retained its
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property has ceased to exist at the time of the testator's death.,, Evidence of
the testator's intent is irrelevant; if the property does not exist, the gift fails.27
Ademption of sums on deposit in a multi-party bank account clearly occurs
where the testator withdraws the funds and applies them to his own use.279
Where the testator withdraws funds from one account and deposits them
in another account or where he places the proceeds of a matured savings
certificate in an account in the same or another financial institution, however,
the application of the doctrine is less certain. If there is a mere alteration in
the form of the property which is the subject matter of the bequest, the legatee
may be entitled to claim the proceeds if he can trace them to the new ac-
count. 210 Each case must turn on its own facts and Minnesota has no statute
to provide even a general rule.
28'
The.reported cases dealing with ademption of specific bequests of bank
accounts may offer some guidance in predicting the outcome of the litigation
arising under the new Act where the testator, having altered the disposition of
an account by will, subsequently alters the form of the account. The Ala-
bama 282 and New Jersey 283 courts have held that no ademption occurs where
funds in an account are removed intact and deposited in another bank where
they may be identified as the same funds. The theory behind the rule is that
the account is referred to for the sole purpose of describing where the item
bequeathed may be found, and thus, where the bequeathed funds are found
elsewhere, the bequest is not adeemed.
28'
The New Jersey and Alabama rule, however, may be limited to cases
where the sums in the account are withdrawn intact and treated as a fund,
for the tracing difficulties are minimal in such circumstances. One New York
original form. For an illustration of the problems involved in such a situation (including a bank
liquidation) see In re Rubinstein's Estate, 169 Misc. 273, 7 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
277. See, e.g., In re Babb's Estate, 200 Cal. 252, 252 P. 1039 (1927); Jacobs v. Button,
79 Conn. 360, 65 A. 150 (1906); In re Smallman's Will, 138 Misc. 889, 247 N.Y.S. 593 (Sur.
Ct. 1931).
278. This so-called "identity" rule was first enunciated in Ashburner v. Macguire, 29 Eng.
Rep. 62 (Ch. 1786).
279. 1 P-H EST. PLAN. 429, at 623 (1971): "A specific bequest of a chose in action is
adeemed if the chose in action is collected by the testator, as where he ... withdraws funds from
a bank account ......
280. In re Estate of Hall, 60 N.J. Super. 597, 160 A.2d 49 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1960).
281. A number of states have attempted a statutory solution to the ademption problem. See,
e.g.. GA. CODE § 113-818 (1972): "If the testator exchanges the property bequeathed for other
of the like character, or merely changes the investment of a fund bequeathed, the law deems the
intention to be to substitute the one for the other, and the legacy shall not fail."
282. Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 119 So. 678 (1929). The court stated that the case in-
volved "specific bequests of a definite fund, which was kept intact, and now fully identified as the
same 'money' bequeathed," and held, "In such case there is no ademption." Id. at 553, 119 So.
at 681.
283. Prendergast v. Walsh, 58 N.J. Eq. 149, 42 A. 1049 (Ch. 1899).
284. "The place of deposit was merely used as descriptive of the thing bequeathed. It was
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case indicates that a contrary result may obtain where the funds are with-
drawn and then commingled with other funds in an account in the same
financial institution. ss Even though tracing is possible, ademption may occur




The position which the Minnesota court would take when confronted with
such a case is unknown. Where the account has simply ceased to exist at the
time of the testator's death, it would appear that the court would hold the
bequest adeemed. 287 Where the funds can be traced, however, one can merely
speculate as to the result.
Suffice it to say that no testator should attempt to avoid the formalities of
revoking a bequest by removing the funds from the multi-party account and
depositing them elsewhere. Conversely, where the testator wishes the bequest
to be carried out, but some valid reason requires that he alter the form of the
account during his lifetime,2 s the will should be amended by codicil to reflect
the change in the form of the account and to avoid the uncertainty and litiga-
tion which may otherwise result.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Multi-Party Accounts Act has changed a muddled judicial
treatment of multi-party accounts to a more certain statutory treatment. The
introduction of statutory forms for use in the creation of the accounts and
provisions permitting a party to alter the disposition of sums on deposit by
will solve some problems that the UPC does not solve. Nevertheless, the Act
is not without its ambiguities, and it gives rise to some new probelms, not pre-
sent at common law nor under the UPC. Until these issues are litigated, cau-
tion dictates that certain steps be taken to accrue maximum advantages from
the Act's provisions while avoiding its potential pitfalls.
Financial institutions may play a major role in disseminating public infor-
mation about the effects and uses of the Act. In this manner, as well as in
their day-to-day dealings with depositors, they can do much to assure that
users of multi-party bank accounts need not suffer unintended results. The
advertising media regularly available to these institutions provide an efficient
and effective means of educating the public.
used to identify the particular money given, and it is entirely settled that, where the place is
merely descriptive, the removal of the things to another place is immaterial .. " Id. at 153,
42 A. at 1051.
285. See In re Anslinger's Estate, 185 Misc. 827, 57 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
286. See id. at 831, 57 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
287. Although there are no Minnesota decisions on point, it would seem safe to assume that
the court would follow the general rule. See note 279 supra and accompanying text.
288. He might, for example, wish to convert a savings account to a savings certificate to
obtain the higher rate of interest paid on such certificates. The depositor might wish to move the
funds from an account in one bank to an account in another for similar, valid reasons. He might,
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The prudent financial institution will provide even more detailed informa-
tion to its own customers. Obviously, it should inform all depositors having
multi-party accounts prior to the effective date of the act of the changes in
their rights which may have been wrought by the legislature. These persons
should be encouraged to alter their account contracts if the results which
would otherwise accrue under the terms of the Act are inconsistent with the
intent of the parties. It might even be desirable to require that new signature
cards be executed with respect to all multi-party accounts existing prior to the
effective date of the Act.
Further, financial institutions must inform their officers and employees of
the change in the law and instruct them in the proper manner of explaining
the Act and its effect to prospective customers. The institution should also
adopt the statutory forms to be used in establishing joint accounts, so that
those who wish to take advantage of the certainty that the forms offer will
have the opportunity to do so. Employees must be cautioned to use great
care when these or any other signature cards are executed so that the intent
of the depositor will be followed.
The practicing bar also has a major role to fill in assuring an orderly transi-
tion to the new rules established by the Act. Effective counseling will require
that the bar become aware of the estate planning and tax planning implica-
tions of the new Act. Problems for the users of multi-party accounts can be
avoided if practicing attorneys advise their clients to avoid the use of certain
techniques, though the Act may purport to authorize them, where the sta-
tutory language is unclear or the practical worth of the technique questionable.
Perhaps the irrevocable trust account, for example, should be avoided alto-
gether until reported case law or amendments to the statute clarify the ques-
tions regarding its legal status and eliminate some of the problems which may
result from its use. Similarly, counsel must exercise great caution when draft-
ing a will to alter the disposition of sums on deposit in a multi-party account.
This is not to denigrate the new Act, but merely to emphasize the fact that
it, as most other new and technical statutes, must be approached with care.
If discretion is exercised by attorneys and financial institutions, the multi-
party account can be used for convenience or as a will substitute with much
more safety in Minnesota today than ever before. On balance, the Act
appears to offer those who use informal methods of transferring property
some of the certainty and flexibility which was in the past available only to
those with the need for and means to establish more complex and expensive
estate planning devices.
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